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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
Vol. 59 NOVEMBER 1960 No. I 
FORMING A SUBSIDIARY IN THE EUROPEAN COMMON 
MARKET* 
Alfred F. Conardf 
THE appearance of a new market which is open to free enter-prise and contains almost as many customers as the United 
States has opened immense opportunities to American enterprises, 
with their unique experience in mass production and mass market-
ing.1 General counsel for large American enterprises are con-
fronted with a new need for some understanding of the problems 
of organizing subsidiary companies2 in this new market. The 
present article is ·wTitten to supply an introduction to the legal 
factors which bear on solutions of these problems.3 
• This is part of a chapter from the second volume of American Enterprise in the 
Common Market: A Legal Profile, which is to be published later this year in the Michigan 
Legal Studies. It is edited by Professor Eric Stein and by Thomas L. Nicholson, Esq., of 
the Chicago Bar. 
t Professor of Law and Director of Graduate Studies, University of Michigan Law 
School. The author acknowledges with gratitude the assistance of a large number of Euro-
pean collaborators who answered questions, and read the manuscript in whole or in part; 
some of the opinions expressed in the article are based on the views of these collaborators. 
The collaborators include: for Belgium, Professor J. Heenen; for France, Professor R. 
Houin; for Germany, Professor R. Serick; for Italy, the late Professor T. Ascarelli, Dr. 
Bruna, and Professor Bernini; for Luxembourg, Mr. E. Arendt; and for the Netherlands, 
Mr. Deelen and Mrs. van Vlis. 
1 See AMERICAN MANAGEMENT AssoCIATION, THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET (1958); 
CO:P.UIUTrEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET (1959). 
2 I use the term "company" here and elsewhere to designate any of the forms of busi-
ness association extant in the Common Market countries which would serve American 
purposes, including the broad range of forms signified by the French societe, the German 
Gesellschaft, the Italian societa, or the Dutch vennootschap. I do not use the term "sub-
sidiary corporation" at this point because a few writers have chosen to identify the word 
"corporation" with only one of the available European business forms - the societt! 
anonyme, Aktiengesellschaft, societa per azioni, or naamloze vennootschap. See especially 
FRIEDMAN AND PUGH, LEGAL AsPEcrs OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT ix, passim (1959). To speak 
at this point only of "subsidiary corporations" would therefore imply exclusion of an 
alternative business form which is preferable in many cases-the socirJte a responsabilite 
limilt!e, Gesellschaft mit beschriinkter Ha/tung, societa a responsabilita limitata, or personen-
vennootschap met beperkte aansprakelijheid. 
Further comment on the terminological problem appears in another part of the text, 
and in notes I 7 to 20 infra. 
8 This article is directed to a reader who has already decided that the formation of a 
European subsidiary is appropriate to his business needs. The difficult questions of 
whether a particular investor should form any subsidiary in the Common Market and, 
if so, whether he should form one or several, horizontally or in tiers, are discussed in the 
author's chapter of the forthcoming STEIN AND NICHOLSON, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE 
COMMON MARKET: A LEGAL PROFILE, but the discussion is omitted from the present article. 
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I. THE COMPANY LAWS OF THE COMMON MARKET 
The lawyer who plans to organize a Common Market sub-
sidiary must first acquire some acquaintance with the company 
laws which are in force there. For the six countries of the Market4 
there are six systems of company law-all different. And there are 
not six, but eight sets of texts, since two of the countries present 
their laws in two official languages (Belgium in French and 
Flemish; Luxembourg in French and German). 
That is taking the worst possible view of the matter. On the 
brighter side, the lawyer will find that four languages cover all 
~ight of the texts. These are French, German, Italian, and Dutch 
(Flemish being a dialect of Dutch). Furthermore, a knowledge 
of the French language will permit the reader to examine official 
texts of three countries (France, Belgium, and Luxembourg), and 
translated texts, with latest amendments, of the other three.5 Com-
plete texts of the relevant laws, with latest amendments, will 
probably be available soon in German as well.6 There are also 
recent English translations available for the Dutch and Italian 
laws, although there are no English language services to keep 
them up-to-date.7 
The list of company laws in the Common Market may be 
lengthened within a few years by a new company law, which 
would be uniform throughout the six countries. An enterprising 
committee of Frenchmen is now studying this possibility.8 But 
the movement in this direction is purely voluntary and unofficial. 
4 Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and Netherlands. 
5 A Paris publisher, Editions Jupiter, prints a loose-leaf service containing the com-
pany laws of the six countries, together with analysis and practical suggestions, under the 
title RECUEILS PRATIQUES DU DROIT DES AFFAIRES DANS LES PAYS DU MARCHE COMMUN (herein-
after REc. PRAT. nu M. C.). In this collection everything not originally in French is trans-
lated into that language; Italian and German legal texts in their original languages are also 
included. 
G The publishers of the REc. PRAT. DU M.C. have advised us that they will shortly 
issue a German language edition. German language translations of company laws of 
foreign countries are also published by the Gesellschaft fur Rechtsvergleichung at Frank-
furt, Germany. 
7 Italy: An English translation of Italian company law was published in 1957 by 
Mediobanca of Milan, under the title THE AMERICAN INVESTORS' DIGEST OF ITALIAN CORPO• 
RATE LAW. 
Netherlands: INTERNATIONAAL JURISDISCH INsrrruUT, NETHERLANDS LEGAL PROVISIONS ON 
COMPANIES LIMITED BY SHARES (1957); VAN DER MEER, DUTCH CORPORATION LAW (1959). 
The Instituut publication is generally in British idiom; Van der Meer, in American. 
s A congress to consider adoption of a "European" company law was held at Paris in 
June 1960 under auspices of the Order of Advocates of Paris, and agreed on a number 
of points. Their proceedings have been published as a supplement to Revue du Marche 
Commun, No. 27 (July-Aug. 1960). 
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Although the Common Market Treaty obliges the Community 
members to seek conformity of legislation on several subjects, 
company law is not on the list.9 
A. Family Resemblances and Divergencies 
Fortunately for the American lawyer, all of the six company 
law systems reveal strong family resemblances, as seen from an 
American perspective. One discovers many concepts which are 
common to the six countries, although seldom met in any of the 
fifty American states. All six legal systems share basic concepts 
which were enunciated in the Napoleonic Civil and Commercial 
Codes. The company laws of Luxembourg, Belgium, and Italy 
also reflect a strong influence of the French Stock Company Law 
of 1867, which is still in effect in France, although considerably 
amended. German company law contains more radical differences 
from the French pattern, reflecting in part its independent his-
torical development. While all the European company laws will 
strike an American lawyer as rather rigid, perhaps even old-
fashioned, he will come closest in the Netherlands to discovering 
the liberty of organization and finance to which he may have be-
come accustomed within the hospitable boundaries of Delaware. 
B. The Official Sources 
When the la-wyer decides to go behind the various paraphrases 
and translations of Common Market company laws, and to consult 
the official texts, he meets a confusing variety of arrangements. 
The common generalization that European law (unlike American) 
is "codified" applies to the law of business companies in only three 
of the six countries-Belgium, Italy, and Netherlands. In Belgium 
and Netherlands, the company law is a part of the commercial 
codes, which collect a large body of law applying to all kinds of 
9 The Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (1957) obliges the 
signatories to "co-ordinate" their legislation with regard to police, security, and health 
regulations on foreigners [art. 56 (2)], their legislation on entry of foreigners into business 
[art. 57 (2)], and their exchange control policies [art. 70 (I)]. They also promise to nego-
tiate about mutual recognition of companies, transfer of nationality of companies, and 
international mergers. But the laws under which companies are formed and operate are 
not included unless they are among the laws having "a direct incidence on the •.• func-
tioning of the Common Market" which are to be "approximated" (art. 100). 
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business transactions.10 Belgian and Dutch lawyers, referring to 
company laws, cite "Commercial Code, Book I, Title IX, article 
60," or "Commercial Code, article 36a." In Italy, the company 
law is incorporated in the Civil Code; this is likely to surprise a 
lawyer with extensive foreign experience, who has learned that 
in twenty or thirty other countries a civil code citation is never a 
reference to the law of business companies. He may be even 
more surprised to find the citation, when he tracks it down, in the 
code division on "Labor Law."11 
Of all the countries, France has the most uncodified collection 
of company laws, reflecting vicissitudes of national history almost 
as picturesquely as the architectural face of Paris.12 Some of the 
principles which underlie company law are still to be found in 
the Civil Code (Articles 1832-1873), although they yield, in com-
mercial matters, to other general rules on companies in the Code 
of Commerce (Articles 18-46). For specific questions of French 
company law one must usually turn to uncodified statutes; the 
principal ones discussed here will be called the "Stock Company 
Law" and the "Limited Liability Company Law." But the French 
have no such handy names for them; they call them (respectively) 
the Law of July 24, 1867, and the Law of March 7, 1925. 
The Stock Company Law has been greatly amended, so that 
not much more than its skeleton remains to witness the will of the 
1867 legislator. The later legislators have sometimes despaired 
of hanging any more on the old skeleton, so that one encounters 
laws which certainly modify the effects of the law of 1867, but are 
not framed as amendments to it and must be separately cited. 
10 Belgium: CODE DE COMMERCE, LIVRE I, Titre IX; WETBOEK VAN KooPHANDEL, Bock 
I, Titel IX (hereinafter cited as C. Com. I-IX, or W.K. I-IX, respectively). Netherlands: 
WErBOEK VAN KOOPHANDEL, art. 15-56h (hereinafter cited as W.K.) 
There are, of course, general principles applicable to companies in many parts of the 
civil codes, especially in the parts on contracts of association. There are also special cor-
poration acts, like the Netherlands act on cooperative associations, which are not integrated. 
The statement in the text applies to a set of rules on business corporations which is approx-
imately as comprehensive as for instance, the American "Model Business Corporation Act." 
11 The company laws, ordinarily cited merely by section of the Civil Code (for in-
stance, Cadice Civile, art. 2397), are arranged as Title V (Delle societti) of Book V (Del 
lavoro). The merger of the commercial code in the civil code is a step which has been 
widely discussed and advocated in other European countries. The incorporation of com-
pany law into labor law is an oddity of the fascist period, in which the codes were revised 
(1942). This unusual arrangement seems to have no effect on the content of the company 
laws, or on their interpretation. 
12 See Houin, Reform of the French Civil Code and the Code of Commerce, 4 AM. J. 
CoMP. L. 485 (1955). 
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Notable examples are the laws of November 16, 1940, and March 
4, 1943-both products of the "collaborationist" government at 
Vichy. Although neither the Stock Company Law nor the Limited 
Liability Company Law are formally parts of the Commercial 
Code, they are always contained as annotations in popular editions 
of the code, along with the Vichy overlays and other supplemen-
tary legislation. 
The legal situation in Germany and Luxembourg is somewhat 
less confusing. Both have relatively modern and comprehensive 
company laws which are entirely separate from the civil and com-
mercial codes. Germany has a Stock Company Law, dating from 
1937, and a separate Limited Liability Company Law dating from 
1892. Luxembourg has a single Companies Law, separate from its 
codes, containing provisions on stock companies, limited liability 
companies and other types of business association. The German 
company laws are contained in popular editions of the German 
Code of Commerce (Handelsgesetzbuch or HBG ), but the Luxem-
bourg laws are available only in a separate booklet.13 
For the benefit of readers who have some familiarity with the 
official texts, I list below the official names of the principal com-
pany laws, followed by the English nickname which I will use in 






Cited in country of English nickname Citation herein 
origin as: 
Code de Commerce, Liv. Code of Commerce C. Com. I-IX 
I, Tit. IX; Wetboek van Book I, Title IX 
Koophandel, Baek I, Tit. 
IX 
Loi du 24 juillet 1867, Stock Company Law of 1867 
sur les societes Law 
Loi du 7 mars 1925, tend- Limited Liability Law of 1925 
ant a instituer des societes Company Law 
a responsabilite limitee 
Gesetz iiber Aktiengesell- Stock Company AktG 
schaften und Kornman- Law 
ditgesellschaften au£ Ak-
tien ("Aktiengesetz") 
18 RECUEIL DES LOIS CONCERNANT LES SoCIETES COMlllERCIALES (1956). 
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Gesetz betreffend die Ge- Limited Liability 
sellschaften mit besch- Company Law 
rankter Haftung (GmbH 
Gesetz) 
Italy Cadice Civile, art. 2247- Civil Code, art. 
2574 2247-2574 
Luxembourg Loi du IO aout 1915 con- Company Law 
cernant les societes com-
merciales; Gesetz vom 10 
August 1915, betreffend 
d i e Handelsgesellschaf-
ten14 
Netherlands Wetboek van Koophan- Code of Commerce 
del, art. 15-56h. art. 15-56h 
II. THE CHOICE OF COMPANY FORM 
A. Two Kinds of "Corporations" 





In five of the six Community countries - all but the Nether-
lands - the American lawyer who has decided to form a "corpora-
tion" will confront an initial puzzle. Each of these countries has 
not one, but two forms of business organization which may fairly 
be called corporations. Both are widely used, both are legal enti-
ties, both are taxed in essentially the same way, and both insulate 
their shareholders from liability for company debts. 
These two forms of organization bear witness to the European 
legislators' desire to provide separate legal structures for those 
entities which Americans call "publicly-held corporations," and 
those which we call "close corporations." One type of European 
company is empowered to offer its shares to the public, and list 
them on stock exchanges, and is obliged to endure the glare of 
publicity on its financial affairs. The other type of European com-
pany is confined to offering its shares to a select few, and enjoys 
relative privacy.111 In these respects, the European dichotomy ap-
14 The provisions governing limited liability companies, although not adopted until 
1933, are framed as an amendment of the law of 1915. Hence, we cite the "Law of 1915" 
for provisions which were not in effect until many years after that date. 
15 An English language introduction to the limited liability company in various Euro-
pean countries may be found in the following articles: Eder, Limited Liability Firms 
Abroad, 13 U. Prrr L. REv. 193 (1952); Israels and Taubenblatt, The Close Corporation 
in Foreign Law, STATE OF NEW YORK, REPORT OF THE LAw REvISION COMMISSION 416 (1948); 
Schneider, The American Close Corporation and its German Equivalent, 14 Bus. LAW. 228 
(1958); Treillard, The Close Corporation in French and Continental Law, 18 LAw & 
CONTEMP. PROB. 546 (1953). 
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pears much like the one which American writers have increasingly 
drawn in recent years. 
But the American dichotomy is a differentiation of fact - a dif-
ference in how the shares are actually held and traded. Legally, 
both kinds of American companies ("close" and "publicly-held") 
belong to the same legal category ("business corporation" or "cor-
poration for profit"), they add the same distinguishing words or 
letters to their corporate name (Co., Corp., Inc., and the like), 
and they are formed under provisions of the same statute (for in-
stance, the Delaware General Corporation Act, or the Illinois Busi-
ness Corporation Act). To pass from the "close" form to the "pub-
licly-held" form requires, at most, minor charter amendments, and 
the filing of securities registration statements.16 
In Europe, on the other hand, these two kinds of companies 
belong to different legal categories, add different words or initials 
to their corporate names, and are formed under different statutes. 
To pass from one form to the other requires the adoption of a com-
pletely new charter, through a procedure called "transformation." 
The Netherlands are like the United States, and unlike the 
rest of Europe, in having only one statute under which both closely 
held and publicly held companies are formed. Companies of both 
types are legally called "naamloze vennootschap,'' just as both are 
legally called "corporation" in the United States. The initials 
"N.V." appear after the company name. If the company happens 
to be closely held, it may be described by bankers as "besloten,'' 
which means "closed." But the appellation of "besloten naamloze 
vennootschap" (like "close corporation") denotes a factual dis-
tinction, rather than a legal one. 
B. What To Call Them - in English 
In order to write in English about legal institutions which do 
not exist in English-speaking countries, one must make some arbi-
trary choices of terminology. I shall use just two terms - "stock 
16 The distinctions between the American close corporation and the European limited 
liability company have been brought out in a series of articles advocating that American 
states should adopt separate close corporation laws. See the following (in historical order): 
Weiner, Legislative Recognition of the Close Corporation, 27 MICH. L. REv. 273 (1929). 
Rutledge, Significant Trends in Modern Incorporation Statutes, 22 "WASH. U.L.Q. 305, 
338-9 (1937); Fuller, The Incorporated Individual: A Study of the One-Man Company, 
51 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1373, 1406 (1938); Winer, Proposing A New York "Close Corporation 
Law," 28 CoRNELL L.Q. 313 (1943); O'Neal, A Plea for Separate Statutory Treatment of the 
Close Corporation, 33 N.Y.U.L. R.Ev. 700 (1958). 
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company" and "limited liability company" to describe the two 
principal kinds of commercial companies which exist in the six 
Common Market countries, under the various names listed below. 
"Stock Company" 
Belgium: 
(French) societe anonyme (SA) 
"Limited Liability Company" 
societe de personnes a responsa-
bilite limitee (SPRL) 
(Flemish) naamloze vennootschap (NV) personenvennootschap met be-
perkte aansprakelijheid 
France: 




societa per azioni (SpA) 
Luxembourg: 
(French) societe anonyme (SA) 
societe a responsabilite limitee 
(SARL) 
Gesellschaft mit beschrankter 
Haftung (GmbH) 
societa a responsabilita limitata 
(SARL) 
societe a responsabilite limitee 
(SARL) 
(German) anonyme Gesellschaft (AG) Gesellschaft mit beschrankter 
Haftung (GmbH) 
Netherlands: 
naamloze vennootschap (NV) 
The terms which I have chosen are used by a number of other 
writers on foreign law,17 and have the additional advantage that 
they are literal, or nearly literal translations of the originals. The 
only important departure from literalness is made for terms which 
17 The following incomplete bibliography on others' usages may be of some interest: 
"Limited Liability Company" {for SARL • GmbH): FRIEDMANN et al., LEGAL AsPECTS OF 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT (1959). 
"Stock company" (for SA-AG): Eder, Spain: New Law of Stock Companies, 1 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 117 (1952); Eder, Spain: Law of Stock Companies, 2 AM. J. COMP. L. 234 (1953). 
"Limited Liability Firm" (for SARL - GmbH): Eder, supra note 15; Eder, Colombia: 
Control of Limited Liability Firms, 2 AM. J. COMP. L. 70 (1953); Eder, Venezuela: Com-
mercial Code, 5 AM. J. COMP. L. 628 (1956). 
"Close Corporation" (for SARL - GmbH): Reverdin and Homburger, The American 
Close Corporation and its Swiss Equivalent, 14 Bus. Law. 263 (1958); Israels and Tauben• 
blatt, supra note 15, at 416. 
"Corporation" (for SA. AG): FRIEDMANN et al., LEGAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
(1959); but cf. FRIEDMANN et al., THE Punuc CORPORATION (1954). 
"Public companies and private companies" (for SA• AG and SARL • GmbH, respec-
tively): Treillard, supra note 15, at 546. 
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if literally translated would be "nameless company" (societe 
anonyme, anonyme Gesellschaft, and naamloze vennootschap ). 
The terminology used here should cause no confusion, except 
for readers who, by reason of previous indoctrination, believe that 
one of the European forms-usually the societe anonyme-is the 
equivalent of the American "corporation." Such readers are 
doomed to a good deal of confusion, regardless of what terminology 
is used here. For the American "corporation" embraces many 
institutions-public and private, profit and non-profit-which are 
quite beyond the scope of any of the European company forms. 
Further, the use of "corporation" for societe anonyme, but not for 
the societe a responsabilite limitee, implies that the one is some-
how more corporate than the other. Any such implication is quite 
false. Both are equally entities, and both equally confer limited 
liability upon their members. Finally, the use of "corporation" 
to translate societe anonyme leaves us without any appropriate 
word to translate the French corporation, the Italian corporazione, 
the Dutch corporatie, and the German Korperschaft, all of which 
have a broad connotation like the American "corporation" in its 
wider usages. 
C. Other Forms of Business Association 
Of course there are many kinds of business associations used in 
Common Market countries in addition to the stock company and 
limited liability company. In each country there are partner-
ships18 and limited partnerships,19 just as in the United States. 
18 Partnerships: 
Belgium: Societe en nom collectif (vennootschap onder gemeenschappelijken naam), 
C. Com. I-IX, arts. 15-17. 
Germany: Ofjene Handelsgesellschaft, Handelsgesetzbuch (hereinafter cited as HGB), 
§§105-160. 
France: Societe en nom collectif, C. Com., arts 20-22. 
Italy: Societa in nome collettivo, Codice Civile, arts. 2291-2312 (hereinafter cited as 
C. Civ.). 
Luxembourg: Societe en nom collectif- ofjene Handelsgesellschaft, loi du 10 aout 
1915, concemant [es societes commerciales (hereinafter cited as Company Law), arts. 14-15. 
Netherlands: Vennootschap onder eene firma, W.K., arts. 16-18. 
10 Limited Partnerships: 
Belgium: Societe en commandite simple (vennootschap bij wijze van enkele geldschiet-
ing), C. Com. I-IX, arts. 18-25. 
Germany: Kommanditgesellschaft, HGB, §§161-177. 
France: Societe en commandite, C. Com., arts. 23-28. 
Italy: Societa in accomandita semplice, C. Civ., arts. 2313-2324. 
Luxembourg: Societe en commandite simple (einfache Kommanditgesellschaft), Com-
pany Law, arts. 16-22. 
Netherlands: Vennootschap bij wijze van geldschieting (or vennootschap en com-
mandite), W.K.., arts. 19-35. 
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There is also in each of the countries a "limited partnership with 
shares,"20 and there are a number of special purpose companies, 
such as mutual insurance companies, co-operative associations and 
credit unions. 
None of these business associations seems likely to be of much 
interest to American traders and investors. Co-operatives and 
credit unions are inherently local. The limited partnership with 
shares is a survival of the slow evolution from partnership to stock 
company, comparable in its role to the American "joint stock 
company." Today it seems to offer no advantages which are not 
exceeded by those of the more usual stock or limited liability 
company. The general partnership seems to be excludable as an 
avenue of American investment, since the participants become 
fully exposed to all the financial risks of a European businessman. 
The limited partnership may deserve some consideration from 
a few American investors. Conceivably an American company 
could be a limited partner, while an individual (American or 
European) might be the general partner in Europe. European 
limited partnerships are very much like American limited partner-
ships under the Uniform Limited Partnership Act, for the simple 
reason that the Anglo-American limited partnership is a business 
form which was directly and consciously copied from a European 
model.21 However, the number of American enterprises which 
would wish to participate in a European limited partnership would 
be very small, and this article will not give further attention to it. 
The "holding company" has also received a good deal of atten-
tion in recent years from European writers and American ob-
servers. It is not, however, a distinctive form of organization; it 
20 The organizations referred to resemble limited partnerships in that some members 
are liable for firm debts, while others are not; they differ from limited partnerships, how-
ever, in their power to issue transferable shares. They have had a historical role as pre-
cursors of the modem stock company and limited liability company, somewhat like the 
role of the "joint stock company" in American law; but it would be quite misleading to 
call them "joint stock companies." 
The following table indicates their various national names, and the laws applicable: 
Belgium: Societt! en commandite par actions (Vennootschap bij wijze van geldschieting 
op aandelen), C. Com. I-IX, arts. 105-115. 
France: Societt! en commandite par actions, Law of July 24, 1867, arts. 1-20. 
Germany: Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien, Aktiengesetz (hereinafter cited as AktG), 
§§219-232. 
Italy: Societa in accomandita per azioni, C. Civ., arts. 2462-2471. 
Luxembourg: Socit!tt! en commandite par actions (Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien) 
Company Law, arts. 102-112. 
Netherlands: Commanditaire vennootschap op aandelen, W.K., arts. 19-21. 
21 See Crane, Are Limited Partnerships Necessary? 17 MINN. L. REv. 351 (1933). 
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is rather, as in the United States, the adaptation of one of the 
other forms of company (usually stock company or limited liability 
company) to a particular purpose.22 
D. The Limited Liability Company-Its Pros and Cons 
Most American corporations seem to have cast their European 
subsidiaries, except in Germany, in the mold of stock companies.23 
On the other hand, European businessmen choose the limited 
liability much more often than the stock company; the ratio of 
preference in France was recently about 3½ to I, and was ap-
parently even higher in Germany.24 Although many of the reasons 
why Europeans might prefer the limited liability company do not 
apply to Americans, this form deserves more consideration than it 
has commonly received. Its unpopularity among Americans may 
result partly from the fact that it looks strange and unfamiliar. I 
will therefore try to outline some of its distinctive features in 
various countries, starting with its disadvantages, and proceeding 
to some bases for preferring it. 
I. Non-negotiability of Shares. One feature of limited liabil-
ity companies which will probably deter some investors is the 
non-negotiability of their shares. Stock companies in all the coun-
tries but Italy normally issue bearer certificates, which are trans-
ferred from one investor to another without any entry on the 
corporate books; the bona fide purchaser prevails over all prior 
22 The only European country of the six which has a special holding company statute 
is Luxembourg: Loi du Jl juillet 1929 sur le regime fiscal des socidtt!s de participations 
financieres (holding companies), reprinted in REcUEIL DES LOIS CONCERNANT LES SOCIETES 
COl\lMERCIALES (1956); Gesetz vom 31 Juli 1929 ilber die Besteuerung der Holdinggesell-
schaf ten, reprinted in GESETZE BETREFFEND DIE HANDELS-, HOLDING-, UND ANDERE GESELL-
SCHAFrEN (1956). However, the holding company is widely used in the Netherlands and 
other countries of the Common Market, without benefit of special legislative provisions. 
23 A casual survey of well-known American subsidiaries in Europe has revealed no 
limited liability companies except in Germany. In that country, General Motors and 
Standard of New Jersey have German subsidiaries which are stock companies, and sub-
subsidiaries which are limited liability companies; Frigidaire GmbH is a subsidiary of 
Adam Opel AG, which is a subsidiary of General Motors; Vereinigte Asphalt und Teer-
produktion Fabriken GmbH, is a subsidiary of Esso AG, which is a subsidiary of Jersey 
Standard. MooDY's INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 2734, 1648 (1959). But Mr. Dieter Schneider, a 
lawyer of Cologne, states that "foreign subsidiaries in Germany are generally established 
in the form of a GmbH." The American Close Corporation and its German Equivalent, 
14 Bus. LAw. 228, 249 (1958). 
24 REcUEILS PRATIQUES DU MARCHE ColllMUN, vol. I, sub. tit. Indications pratiques, for 
France states that in 1957, 3270 SARL were formed, compared with 952 SA. The ratio 
of total companies in existence favors the SARL even more strongly. In Western Germany 
figures of companies in existence in 1955 showed 34,254 GmbH against 3060 AG. REc. 
PRAT. DU M.C., Indications pratiques, for Germany. 
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claimants.2is In Italy, stock companies no longer issue bearer 
shares, but registered shares are considered "negotiable" just as 
in the United States.26 Limited liability companies' shares are 
never considered negotiable; they must always be transferred on 
the books of the company;27 in Germany the transfers must even 
be notarized;28 in Italy, no certificates of ownership are issued.20 
The buyer of a limited liability company share (with or without 
a certificate) takes it subject to any adverse claim of title, any claim 
of the company for unpaid share subscriptions, and any restrictions 
on transfer, to which the transferor was subject. 
In some, but no~ all, countries, there are further impediments 
to free trading in shares. In Belgium, France, and Luxembourg, 
shares in a limited liability company cannot be sold to non-
members without the consent of a specified majority of the other 
shareholders.30 This provision puts a minority shareholder at the 
mercy of the controlling group when he decides to sell. It is one 
of the factors which cause Frenchmen to form a stock company 
rather than a limited liability company, even when they intend it 
to be closely held. In Germany and Italy, there is no rule requiring 
consent to transfer unless it is voluntarily inserted in the corporate 
charter.31 
2. Exclusion From Financial Markets. A second disadvantage 
of the limited liability company is the fact that it cannot raise 
money by public issue of stocks and bonds, nor can its securities be 
25 Belgium: C. Com. I-IX, art. 45; France: C. Com., art. 35; Germany: AktG, §10; 
Luxembourg: Company Law, art. 37; Netherlands: W.K., art. 38c. 
26 Company law (C. Civ. 2355) permits bearer shares as in other countries, but royal 
decrees have suspended the permission since 1941 (decrees of Oct. 25, 1941 and March 29, 
1942). Hence, all share transfers must be registered and are governed by C. Civ., arts. 
2021-2027. But there is no provision, as in the limited liability company law, that transfers 
are ineffective even between the parties until registered. 
27 Belgium: C. Com. I-IX, art. 125 (share transfer not effective until registered); 
France: Law of 1925, arts. 21 (shares not negotiable), 23 (transfer incomplete until the 
company is formally notified); Germany: Gesetz betreffend die Gesellschaften mit beschriink-
ter Haftung (hereinafter cited as GmbHG), §15 (requiring that all transfers be made with 
judicial or notarial formality); Italy: C. Civ., art. 2479 (transfer ineffective until registered); 
Luxembourg: Company Law, art. 190 (transfer incomplete until the company is formally 
notified). 
28 Germany: GmbHG, §15, ,i3. 
29 Italy: C. Civ., art. 2472. 
30 Belgium: C. Com. I-IX, art. 126; France: Law of 1925, art. 22; Luxembourg: Com-
pany Law, art. 189. 
31 Germany: GmbHG, §15, ,i5 (expressly stating that transfers may be restricted by 
charter provisions). 
Italy: C. Civ., art. 2479 (stating that shares are transferable in ·the absence of contrary 
provisions in the articles of incorporation). 
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traded on the securities markets. Some of the countries have a 
specific prohibition against public issue or trading.32 In others, the 
same effect is achieved by prohibitions against issuing the kinds of 
securities which outside investors would want to buy. One of these 
prohibitions, previously explained, is the one on issuing negotiable 
shares. A further prohibition, effective in Belgium, France, Italy, 
and Luxembourg, prohibits the public issue of bonds.33 
These prohibitions do not prevent limited liability companies 
from financing themselves from private sources. The rules about 
stock would be no impediment to shareholding by a select group of 
individuals or, except in Belgium, by a parent or a consortium of 
investing companies; only the general public are excluded. Like-
wise, loans can be "privately placed" with banks and insurance 
companies. Since public issues of bonds are relatively less im-
portant in Europe than in the United States,34 the inhibition on 
public bond issues will probably not make much practical dif-
ference to a company until it becomes very large and well-known. 
3. Other Disadvantages. A few other special features of the 
limited liability company which may deter its use at particular 
times and places must be mentioned. Belgium has a peculiar rule 
requiring that all shareholders be natural persons and not corpora-
tions.311 According to Professor Heenen of Brussels (my Belgian 
collaborator) this is a rule of substance, not to be evaded by use of 
dummy shareholders. Hence, the limited liability company must 
be written off as a form of corporate subsidiary in Belgium; but it 
might make a good affiliate for an American close corporation, 
whose principal shareholders could also hold shares in the Belgian 
limited liability company. 
France has a rule of income taxation whereby the salaries paid 
to majority shareholders of a limited liability company are regarded 
as profit distributions, rather than as wages, and incur a 22 percent 
82 Luxembourg: Company Law, art. 188; France: Law of 1925, arts. 4, 37. 
83 The prohibition is variously phrased. In France and Luxembourg, it is directed 
against "public issues" of all kinds. France: Law of 1925, art. 4; Luxembourg: Company 
Law, art. 188. In Belgium and Luxembourg, it is simply a prohibition against issuing 
"obligations," which is construed to forbid the type of obligations bought by investing 
public, not the type taken by banks. Belgium: C. Com. I-IX, art. 131; Italy: C. Civ., art. 
2486. 
34 The decline in private lending through bonds is discussed in another section of the 
chapter whicl1 will appear in American Enterprise in the Common Market. The reasons 
are complex; one is investors' fear of inflation; another is the wiping out by past inflation 
of the family fortunes, endowments, and insurance reserves which would othenvise be 
invested in bonds. 
85 C. Com. I-IX, art. 119. 
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basic tax (before the progressive surtax) instead of the 5 percent 
payroll tax which falls on salaries of stock company officers. This 
has driven many French businessmen to desert the limited liability 
company in favor of a stock company; but it will not be any prob-
lem to American-owned limited liability companies, since it is 
unlikely that their salaried officers will be majority shareholders. 
We presume that shares will be held by corporations, rather than 
individuals. 
Italy has a set of unfavorable tax rulings which have been 
applied to the limited liability company. On the one hand, its 
profits are subjected to the corporation income tax, which partner-
ships and individual enterprises escape; on the other hand, its 
share transfers are subjected to a business transfer tax which cor-
poration shares escape. Thus it has double disadvantages. Until 
one of these inconsistent rulings is abandoned, the limited liability 
company must be avoided in Italy; but my collaborators view this 
problem as temporary. When it is solved, the Italian limited 
liability company may be a relatively attractive form of enterprise. 
Some of my European collaborators report that the limited 
liability company is viewed with suspicion by creditors because it 
has been used so often for under-capitalized enterprises which 
eventually failed; the stock company on the other hand enjoys a 
presumption of financial responsibility. But I suppose that the 
presumption against the limited liability company is readily re-
butted by evidence of adequate capitalization, or by the parent 
company's willingness to guarantee particular undertakings. 
4. Restrictability of Share Transfers. Restrictions on transfer 
were listed above as possible disadvantages in the limited liability 
company. Restrictions are a disadvantage to a capitalist who 
wants to induce maximum financial participation in his company 
by outside investors. But many American corporations, contem-
plating investments in foreign countries, are much more concerned 
with keeping investors out than with getting them in. Such cor-
porations issue a very minimum of shares to others than the parent 
corporation itself, and require each recipient to agree in ·writing 
to make no disposition without consent. 
Where the desire is to minimize public participation in the 
company's equity, the limited liability company offers definite 
attractions. In Belgium, France, and Luxembourg the shares are 
automatically non-transferable unless a specified majority of the 
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other shareholders consents.36 In Italy and Germany, the law does 
not impose this restriction, but permits its insertion in the com-
pany charter.37 
It is true that some degree of non-negotiability is also attainable 
in stock company shares. Professor Houin believes that a 
numerical majority of French stock companies would be found to 
have some rules restricting stock transfer. But restrictions on 
transfer are not expressly authorized by the stock company laws 
of all countries,38 and the extent to which transfers may be validly 
restricted is not clearly defined either by case law or by legal 
theory.30 
5. Number of Shareholders. A second feature of the limited 
liability company which may attract some Americans is the smaller 
number of shareholders requirc;:d. In Belgium, France, and 
Luxembourg, a stock company requires seven shareholders,40 
while a limited liability company requires only two.41 According 
to the prevailing view of lawyers in these countries, the share-
holders must be bona fide in that they must pay their own money 
for their shares. But each one need not hold more than one share; 
and they may be bound by contract to assign the share to someone 
else on demand of the parent company.42 
European lawyers generally do not consider shareholder re-
quirements as a weighty consideration. Even if they are violated, 
the principal consequence (in Belgium, France, and Luxembourg) 
is liability to an annulment proceeding, which in France can be 
arrested by restoring the number of shareholders to seven (pro-
vided they have never dropped below two).43 Since a shareholder's 
30 Note 30 supra. 
87 Note 31 supra. 
38 Germany expressly authorizes charter restrictions on transfer of stock company 
shares: AktG, §61 (3). But many desired forms of restriction are beyond the statutory 
authorization. See SCHLEGELBERGER-QUASSOWSKI, KOMMENTAR ZUM AKTIENGESErZ §71, Anmer-
kung 9 (1939). 
30 An interesting exchange of views on the subject in Belgium is contained in a pair 
of comments by Coppens, 64 JOURNAL DES TRIBUNAUX 215 (1949), and de Rouvreux, 55 
REvuE PRATIQUE DES Socnrrts C!VILES ET CoMMERCIALES 54 (1956). Cf. VAN RYN, PRINCIPES 
DE DRorr Cm,IMERCIAL, Part I, 364 (1954). For Germany, see Schneider, supra note 15, at 
233. 
40 Belgium: C. Com. I-IX, art. 29; France: Law of 1867, art. 23; Luxembourg: Company 
Law, art. 26. 
41 Belgium: C. Com. I-IX, art. 119; France: Law of 1925, art. 5; Luxembourg: Company 
Law, art. 183. 
42 Cf. Lepaulle and Jeantet in FRIEDMANN et al., LEGAL AsPECTS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
214, 220-221 (1959). 
43 Ibid. 
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derivative suit cannot be brought by less than five percent of the 
shareholders, European lawyers have no such fear of small share-
holders as American lawyers generally do. 
Whatever the merits of this European view may be, most Ameri-
can parent companies in fact will be extremely cautious in the 
selection of the other six shareholders, and in maintaining amicable 
relations with them. The time and trouble involved in finding 
six such shareholders and keeping them happy can be reduced by 
using the limited liability company form, which requires only one 
shareholder in addition to the parent company. 
The difference in required number of shareholders has less 
significance in the other countries. In Italy, two shareholders are 
enough for either type of company.44 Even if there is only one, 
the company does not cease to exist; it merely ceases to insulate the 
sole shareholder from personal liability for debts of the company.4 ts 
In Germany, there is a difference in the number of incorporators 
required (five in the stock company; two in the limited liability 
company),46 but there is no objection to 100 percent ownership by 
a single shareholder after the company is once formed.47 Hence 
the selection of the extra incorporators does not demand much 
attention in either Germany or Italy. The Netherlands have no 
limited liability companies, but two incorporators are enough to 
form a stock company, and the number of shareholders after in-
corporation need not exceed one. 
6. Number of Officers and Directors. A third attractive 
feature of the limited liability company is the simplicity of manage-
ment structure permitted by law. A small limited liability com-
pany can operate with no board of directors, no president, no 
auditors, and only a single manager.48 It is not even necessary to 
44 C. Civ., art. §2247. 
45 Id., art. 2362. 
46 AktG, §2: five members; GmbHG, §2: specifying no number, but implying plurality. 
47 BAUllfBACH-HUECK, AKTIENGESETZ, Anhangnach §15 (9th ed. 1956). 
48 Belgium: C. Com. I-IX, art. 129. But a board of auditors must be named if there 
are more than five shareholders. Id., art. 134. The single manager is called a gt!rant, or 
beheerder. 
France: Law of 1925, art. 24. But if there are more than 20 shareholders, a board of 
supervision (conseil de surveillance) must be named, id., art. 32. The single manager is 
called gt!rant. 
Germany: GmbHG, §6. But there must be a supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) if there 
are over 500 employees, by the terms of the Betriebsverfassungsegesetz §77, Oct. 11, 1952. 
The single manager is called a Geschiiftsfiihrer. 
Italy: C. Civ., art. 2487. But an auditing committee (collegio sindacale) is required if 
the capital is over 1,000,000 lire (about $1,500). Id., art. 2488. The single manager is 
called an amministratore unico. 
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hold a shareholders' meeting to elect the manager; he may be 
named in the articles, and hold office indefinitely without the 
necessity for annual elections.49 
This simple arrangement is not recommended as a permanent 
structure in any company; but it may be extremely convenient in 
the early years of a foreign venture. The parent company may 
not know to whom it can wisely entrust the decision-making 
power in a European country; it will hope to avoid naming board 
members whom it may later wish to remove and replace. 
In contrast, the stock company is required by law to provide 
itself with a panoply of officialdom which is sometimes quite 
premature. The requirements are most elaborate in Germany, 
where every stock company must have a supervisory board 
( A uf sichtsrat) of three or more members who are not themselves 
executives of the company, but who elect one or more other persons 
to an executive board (V orstand ).50 In other words, the investor 
in a stock company must find three policy-makers whom he trusts 
enough to put in charge of his business, but who are not employed 
in it, plus one full-time executive. In a limited liability company, 
he needs to find only the executive. 
A similar number of persons must be found in Italy-at least 
three auditors (sindaci) who are neither employees of the company 
nor relatives of the manager, and at least one manager (amminis-
tratore ).ra But the choice is a little less momentous, since the 
three auditors do not have the extensive powers of the German 
supervisory board. 
In France and Belgium, likewise, four persons must be found 
to fill the necessary positions-three managers ( administrateurs, 
beheerders) and at least one auditor (commissaire, commisaris).52 
The directors may be employees of the company, but the auditors 
must be strictly independent-not employed by the managers or by 
the company, and not related by blood or marriage, to the man-
agers.53 The requirements are the same in Luxembourg except 
Luxembourg: Company Law, art. 191. There is no limit on the size of the company 
which may be governed by a single manager, called gerant or Geschiiftsfilhrer. 
40 Belgium: C. Com. I-IX, art. 129; France: Law of 1925, art. 24; Germany: GmbHG, 
§6; Italy: C. Civ., arts. 2487 and 2383; Luxembourg: Company Law, art. 191. 
ISO AktG, §§70, 86, 90. 
ISl C. Civ., arts. 2380, 2397, 2399. 
IS2France: Law of November 16, 1940, art. I (managers); Law of 1867, art. 32 (auditors); 
Belgium: C. Com., I-IX, arts. 55 and 64. 
ISSFrance: Law of 1867, art. 33; Belgium: C. Com. I-IX, art. 64, quater (as amended 
by law of Dec. I, 1953). 
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that there are no statutory prohibitions of family or business 
relationships between the auditor and the company or its man-
agers.54 
The privilege of operating a limited liability company with 
a single manager is available only to "smaller" enterprises, but the 
criteria of smallness vary greatly. In Italy, the line is dra·wn at the 
meager capital of one million lire (about $1500); above that, 
auditors are required.55 In Germany, the line is drawn at 500 
employees; with more, a three-man supervisory board is required.50 
In Belgium and France, the line is dra·wn in terms of number of 
shareholders; such a line need never be crossed by a typical cor-
porate subsidiary. The penalty for crossing is a three-man board 
of auditors.57 Only Luxembourg sets no statutory size limit to the 
companies which may use the single-manager system: perhaps size 
limits in Luxembourg are imposed by geography. 
The weight which should be given to these personnel require-
ments varies somewhat among the countries. A few officers, like 
the executives (V orstand) in a German stock company, and per-
haps the manager (gerant) in a French limited liability company, 
cannot be removed from their position without proof of unfitness 
for the office.58 Most officers, including the members of the govern-
ing boards in France and Germany ( conseil d' administration, 
A ufsichtsrat ), are removable at the pleasure of the shareholders.59 
As to officers of the latter type, the investor can, if necessary, au-
thorize his European counsel to fill the positions with docile indi-
viduals who will vote as instructed, and resign when requested; 
that is, with "dummy directors." Certainly the difficulty of filling 
positions should not stand in the way of selecting a form of organi-
zation which is strongly indicated by the financial requirements of 
the enterprise. But, other things being equal, useless cogs in the 
administrative machinery are to be avoided for the same reason as 
are useless parts in the power plant. 
7. Labor Representation. In Germany, a unique factor favor-
ing the limited liability company is encountered. In every stock 
company, regardless of size, one-third of the supervisory board mem-
54 Luxembourg: Company Law, art. 61. 
55 C. Civ., art. 2488. 
56 Betriebsverfassungsgesetz, §77 (hereinafter cited as BetrVerfG). 
57 Belgium: C. Com. I-IX, art. 134; France: Law of 1925, art. 32. 
58 France: Law of 1925, art. 24, but case law has permitted some modification by 
provision in the articles; Germany: AktG, §75 (3). 
59 Belgium: C. Civ., I-IX, art. 53; France: Law of 1867, art. 22; Germany: AktG, §87 (3): 
Italy: C. Civ., art. 2383; Netherlands: W.K.., art. 48b. 
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hers (who choose the executives) must be labor representatives. 
This requirement does not affect limited liability companies until 
they have 500 or more employees.60 
8. Privacy. A few American investors may also be attracted to 
the limited liability company by the greater financial privacy per-
mitted in some countries. In Germany and Luxembourg, for ex-
ample, stock companies must publish their annual financial state-
ments, 01 while limited liability companies do not have to. But the 
resulting disclosure is no greater, and usually less, than unlisted 
American corporations' statements in Moody's or Standard and 
Poor's. 
9. Other Advantages. There are other advantages in the lim-
ited liability company form which contribute to its popularity 
among small businessmen in Europe. One of these is a smaller 
minimum capital; in Germany, a stock company must have mini-
mum capital of about $25,000, while $5,000 will do for a limited 
liability company.02 Another is the simplicity of the papers to be 
drawn up; they are such that a European businessman may feel 
safe in preparing them without a lawyer. Some laws permit pub-
lishing an extract of limited liability company articles, while stock 
company articles must be published in full at greater expense. 
These advantages will not be of much interest to American inves-
tors in Europe; they are pin pricks in relation to the major ex-
penses and difficulties inherent in a transatlantic plunge. 
C. Transformation 
The choice between stock company and limited liability com-
pany, once made, is not irreversible. In each country which offers 
the choice, there is also a procedure for changing from one to 
another, called "transformation."03 Like incorporation, it involves 
60 BetrVerfG, §77. "Family-owned" stock companies are exempted from the labor rep-
resentation requirement, regardless of number of employees. 
01 Germany: AktG, §143; Luxembourg: Company Law, art. 75. In France, the duty to 
publish financial statements falls only on those stock companies which are listed on a 
stock exchange. Ord. 59-247, Feb. 4, 1959; J.O. Feb. 8, 1959, p. 1754; L'ACTUALITE JURIDIQUE 
1959. III. 62. 
02 AktG, §7 (100,000 DM minimum for a stock company), GmbHG, §5 (20,000 DM 
minimum for a limited liability company). The minima are even lower in other countries; 
Italy requires 1,000,000 lire (about $1,500) for a stock company and 50,000 lire (about $75.00) 
for a limited liability company. C. Civ., arts. 2327, 2474. 
63 Belgium: The procedure is nonstatutory. France: Law of 1925, art. 41 (transforma-
tion); Germany: AktG, §§263-277 (Umwandlung); Italy: C. Civ., art. 2498 (trasformazione); 
Luxembourg: Procedure is non-statutory. 
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drawing up new articles, and depositing and publishing various 
copies or extracts; the expenses are probably about the same as for 
incorporation. 
However, transformation is not necessarily a "tax-free reorgani-
zation," in the American sense. In Belgium and Germany, at least, 
it is viewed under tax laws as a sale of assets unless it comes within 
certain strict limitations. If it is not within these limits, it incurs 
transfer taxes based on the value of the assets transferred, and income 
tax on previously unrealized or unreported gains. In Germany, the 
limits are fairly wide; it is sufficient that both companies (the sub-
merging, and the emerging) are German, that 100 percent of the 
assets pass in exchange for stock in the new company, and that the 
book entries be such as to negative any concealment of tax liability. 
In Belgium there is no statutory exemption, but only a practice of 
the treasury not to claim taxes in those cases in which both the 
members and the assets of the company remain the same after the 
transformation as before. In France, on the other hand, transfor-
mation seems to be tax-free by general rule. 
We understand that the burdens and risks of transformation 
are enough to deter the ordinary incorporator from forming a lim-
ited liability company with the intention of transforming it to a 
stock company a few years later, or vice versa. The form is chosen 
for keeps, although later events sometimes lead the choosers to 
reverse their original choice. The situation is not like that in Eng-
land or the United States, where every company is born as a "pri-
vate company" or "close" corporation, and becomes a "public" 
company or corporation of "public issue" by virtue of later acts. 
In Europe it is usual for the lawyer to attempt to foresee the ulti-
mate character of the enterprise, and to incorporate in the form 
which is appropriate to that ultimate character. 
Ill. THE CHOICE OF A STATE OF INCORPORATION 
A. The Determining Factors 
One of the features of European incorporation which differen-
tiates it most sharply from incorporation in the United States is 
the absence of freedom of choice of the state of incorporation. The 
European lawyer who is forming an operating company does not 
incorporate in the country whose tax or corporation laws are most 
favorable, without regard to where the company's headquarters 
are going to be. His choice is already made by the client who has 
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decided, for other reasons, where he wants to locate the "central 
office" of the business.04 
The reasons for this absence of freedom are connected with two 
rules of law. One of these is a rule found in the corporation statute 
of each country, which provides that the articles must designate a 
central office (siege, Sitz, sede, zetel) which, at least inferentially, 
must be in that country.05 In this respect they differ from the 
Delaware corporation act, which requires designation only of "its 
principal office ... in this State,"66 or the Illinois act, which calls 
for "the address ... of its initial registered office in this State."61 A 
classic view among European theorists is that if the actual central 
office is in a country other than that of the office designated in the 
articles, the company is in violation of its charter, and is exposed to 
various undesirable (if unspecified) consequences.68 A few contem-
porary writers have questioned whether there are really any serious 
consequences to be feared,69 and a Dutch authority declares that the 
Dutch Minister of Justice often ignores kno""t-rn violations of the 
rule.70 The Italian law specifically permits a company to adopt, 
by amendment of its charter, a foreign central office.11 But in coun-
tries other than the Netherlands and Italy, an American-o"t-\Tlled 
enterprise would be unwise to make a deliberate test of the rule. 
The second rule which inhibits freedom of choice of place of 
incorporation is a rule of conflicts of laws. According to prevailing 
64 I adopt for use in comparative law the term employed by 2 RABEL, THE CoNFLicr 
OF LAWS 31 (1947). Since this concept is not used in Anglo-American law, there is no 
precise legal parallel, although it is much like the "home office" of an insurance company. 
o;; All the laws require that the articles of incorporation be filed at the commercial 
court or commercial registry, or both, of the district in which the company has its "central 
office," in terms whicl1 leave no doubt that a court or registry in the country of the legis-
lator is intended. See, for example: France, Law of 1867, art. 55; Germany, AktG §28. 
The Netherlands law specifically states that the central office (plaats van vestiging) must 
be within the Netherlands. "\V.K., art. 36c. There are exceptions in the Netherlands and 
elsewhere, enacted in contemplation of enemy occupation, which permit temporary re-
moval of the central office for emergency reasons which will not enter into the planning 
of American investors. 
66 Del. Gen. Corporation Law, DEL. CODE ANN., §102 (a) (2) (1953). The wording admits 
the possibility of other "principal offices" in any number of other states. 
61 Illinois Business Corporation Act, §47b, ILL. STAT. ANN. (Smith-Hurd, 1954), 
§157.47 (b). 
68 RIPERT, TRArrt :£LEMENTAIRE DE DROIT CO!IIIIIERCIAL 268 (1954); VON GODIN-
WILHELMI, AKTIENGESETZ, §5, Anmerkung 6 (1937); KOLLEWIJN, AMERICAN-DUTCH PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAw, No. 3 Bilateral Studies in Private International Law 16 (1955). 
Kollcwijn is somewhat skeptical of this view, but recognizes it as "prevailing." 
00 See BEITZKE, JUR!STISCHE PERSONEN II\{ INTERNATIONAL PRIVATRECHT UND FREMDENRECHT 
104 (1938). 
70 Sec KoLLEWIJN, op. cit. supra note 68, at 16. 
71 C. Civ., art. 2437. 
22 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 59 
European opm1on, a corporation's internal affairs and its legal 
existence are governed by the law of the place where the central 
office is located.72 This seems to mean the actual central office, not 
a fictitious one stated in the articles. Under the prevailing Ameri-
can rule the corporation's existence and internal affairs are gov-
erned by the state of incorporation, wherever it may establish its 
central office.75 Following the European theory it is said that a 
company which is organized under the laws of one country and 
maintains its central office in another is invalid at the situs of its 
central office because it was not organized in accordance with the 
laws prevailing there.76 
Professor Ernst Rabel, discussing this question in terms of a 
Delaware corporation doing business in Europe, declared: 
"A corporation constituted in Delaware with headquarters 
in Amsterdam will be considered subject to Dutch law on the 
whole European Continent, and therefore on principle as 
non-existent .... 
"While this essence of the rule has often been misunder-
stood, especially in the English literature and by German 
writers too, the policy behind the rule also has not always been 
appreciated. The most important viewpoint from which to 
consider the rule is that of a state that does not want an organi-
72 RABEL, op. cit. supra note 64, at 33-37; BATIFFOL, TRArrt ELEMENTAIRE DE DRorr 
INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 232, 453 (1955); WOLFF, DAS INTERNATIONALE PRIVATRECHT DEUTSCH-
LANDS 115 (1954); KoLLEWIJN, op. cit. supra note 68, at 16. 
This view was crystallized in a uniform law in the Hague Treaty of May 11, 1951, 
signed by the Benelux countries, but which has never come into effect because it was not 
ratified by the Netherlands. It stated in article 3 of that treaty that: "The existence of a 
legal person and its organs or representation shall be determined by the country of its 
seat •••• For the purposes of this Article, an artificial person shall be considered to have 
its seat at the place where its central control is located." These provisions, which have no 
legal force, are regretted by Kollewijn. According to my informants, these provisions are 
a major obstacle to ratification, and may be dropped. 
The rule that the company is governed by the law of its central office is apparently 
codified by the laws of Belgium and Luxembourg, both of which provide in identical terms 
that, "every company whose principal establishment is in Belgium [in the Grand Duchy] 
is subject to the Belgian [Luxembourg] law, even if the incorporation took place in a foreign 
country." Belgium: C. Com. I-IX, art. 197; Luxembourg: Company Law, art. 159. This 
seems to be understood as referring to the central office, rather than to the site of exploita-
tion. 
Italy: The code declares that all companies are subject to Italian company law if they 
have their central office or principal activity in Italy (C. Civ. 2505), although inconsistently 
declaring that Italian law applies to companies formed in Italy, but active principally 
abroad (C. Civ. 2509). See also Loussouarn, Chronique, REvuE TRIM. DE DRorr COMM. 
1959.250, commenting on art. 58 of the Treaty of Rome. 
73-74 Omitted. 
75 REsTATEMENT, CoNFLicr OF LAws §§155, 182 ff (1934); RABEL, op. cit. supra note 
64, at 31. 
76 WoLFF, op. cit. supra note 57, at 115-116. 
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zation to establish its principal office in its territory and yet 
derive its existence and legal character from a foreign state. 
Thus, in the oldest decision of the German Supreme Court on 
this matter, a company incorporated in the state of Washing-
ton, United States, for the purpose of exploiting Mexican 
mines, but which was controlled by a board of directors in 
Hamburg, Germany, was denied recognition as an American 
legal entity; having failed to fulfill the German requirements 
for incorporation, it was treated as a German noncorporate as-
sociation. When a domestic company transfers its domicil to a 
foreign country, it loses its personality."77 
In the view of Mr. Deelen, my Dutch collaborator, Professor 
Rahel's choice of Amsterdam as a hypothetical site was unfortu-
nate. Mr. Deelen cites with approval Kollewijn's observation with 
respect to a corporation formed under foreign law but having its 
actual central office in Holland as follows: 
"It is out of the question that a Dutch judge would ever, 
on this sole ground (there being no fraud or public policy 
considerations) declare a corporation null and void, and no 
decision to that effect has ever been rendered.''78 
Conversely, he believes that corporations could be formed in 
the Netherlands and operate their affairs from headquarters in 
Germany or France without objection from the Dutch government 
or courts. 
An investor cannot safely take advantage of this Dutch liberal-
ism, however, unless he is assured of equally tolerant views in the 
neighboring countries in which the other part of the game would 
be played. Despite intimations of similar tolerance by occasional 
writers in other countries,79 the weight of authority (and of our 
collaborators) cautions against experimenting with these rules of 
law. The safe course is to organize where the central office is to 
be, and to centralize management unambiguously at that office. 
Although there is no freedom to choose a state of incorporation 
which is different from the state of the central office, there is no 
77 2 RADEL, op. cit. supra note 64, at 37-39. 
78 KoLLEWIJN, op. cit. supra note 68, at 16. The result also seems to be precluded' by 
the Netherlands-U.S. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, which provides in 
Article XXIII, §3, that "Companies constituted under the applicable laws and regulations 
within the territories of either party shall be deemed companies thereof, and shall have 
their juridical status recognized within the territories of the other party." T.I.A.S. 3942. 
70 E.g., BEITZKE, op. cit. supra note 69. 
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prohibition against choosing a central office location which is out-
side the country of the principal business operations.8° For in-
stance, a company could establish its main office in Luxembourg, 
although its principal business consisted of exploiting coal mines 
in the Netherlands or operating steel mills in France.81 The "cen-
tral" office is identified by reference to activities of management 
and supervision, rather than manufacture and sale. 
According to my collaborators, little use is made, and little 
should be made, of this technical freedom. It is quite unlike oper-
ating a Hoboken refinery from a Manhattan executive office, be-
cause there are between any two European countries a flock of 
actual or potential barriers which have not existed since 1865 be-
tween American states. There are passport clearance to travel 
from one to the other, differences of currency, possible exchange 
restrictions, and customs (until 1972). All these barriers impede 
the intimate contact between management and operations which 
is just as essential to optimum efficiency in Europe as it is in the 
United States. 
There is another reason for not separating management from 
operations. It is peculiarly European. European managers with 
whom we have spoken emphasize the necessity of constant contacts 
with government, since price changes, wage changes, and major 
building programs must frequently be approved by an official of a 
national ministry. It is reliably reported that the notoriously un-
economic concentration of French industry in the Paris area is 
influenced by the need of managements to be simultaneously near 
their plants and near their ministers. Consequently, it is unlikely 
that a company organized to mine or manufacture solely in France 
would locate its central office in Germany or vice versa. However, 
if a single company were formed to mine and manufacture in both 
France and Germany, it might locate its central office in either of 
the countries, and would not need to move because the activities 
in the foreign country grew larger than those in the country of the 
central office. Or it might choose a central office between its opera-
tional sites, as, for example, in Luxembourg. 
so See R!PERT, op. cit. supra note 68, at 396; BATIIFOL, op. cit. supra note 72, at 232; 
WoLFF, op. cit. supra note 72, at 115; RABEL, op. cit. supra note 64, at 40. 
81 But Loussouam, in LES CONFLITS DE LOIS EN MATJERE DE SOCIETES 135 (1949), con• 
tends that a central office which did not coincide with any important operations would be 
presumptively fraudulent. 
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B. The "Delawares of Europe" 
The views expressed in the preceding paragraphs may surprise 
many American lawyers, who have been told that Liechtenstein, 
or Switzerland, or Luxembourg, is the "Delaware of Europe." Such 
metaphors convey more falsity than truth. In so far as they suggest 
that these countries furnish a convenient place for incorporating 
a company which will have its central office and principal opera-
tions in other countries, they are false both in law and practice. 
None of these countries is commonly used or could be advanta-
geously used for such purposes for the reasons already given. 
A second meaning of such a metaphor might be that the laws 
of these countries permit great freedom in financial operations, 
such as, for example, the payment of "nimble dividends" when 
capital is impaired, or the assignment of most of the share consid-
eration to surplus which can be freely paid out as dividends. 
These suppositions would also be baseless, at least as to Switzerland 
and Luxembourg. 
Or it might be supposed that these countries have lower incor-
poration fees than neighboring countries, as Delaware's franchise 
tax, for example, is lower than that of most industrial states.82 I 
do not have complete information on the incorporation fees in 
these countries, but I understand that incorporators are not drawn 
to them by cost advantages of this kind. 
It is true, however, that certain investors do seek out these 
countries as places in which to incorporate and manage their com-
panies, in preference to neighboring countries. There are two 
principal reasons for making such a choice. Sometimes the reason 
is that one of these countries has been found to be a genuinely 
efficient place to locate a central office. Switzerland and Luxem-
bourg are both central in a geographical sense, and they both have 
a long tradition of permitting the free transfer of international 
balances. It seems doubtful that Liechtenstein would be chosen for 
operational advantages of this kind. 
A second reason for choosing one of these corporate havens is 
to form a holding company to hold the shares of operating compa-
nies which have been organized in other countries. The usual 
functions of such companies are to serve as a reservoir for profits 
82 For a convenient comparison of organization fees in various states, see P-H CoRP. 
SERV. §§10011-10061. 
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which a parent company wants to take out of the operating sub-
sidiary, but does not want to put into its own treasury, because of 
the taxes or exchange restrictions which would be incurred. Switz-
erland, Luxembourg, and Liechtenstein have laws and practices 
which lend themselves to these purposes. Thus it appears that the 
analogy between Delaware and the European corporate "havens" 
is not a close one, although it has some validity. 
IV. THE EUROPEAN LAWYERS' ROLE IN INCORPORATION 
The procedures of incorporation in the countries of the Euro-
pean Common Market are basically similar to procedures in the 
United States. They start with some rather mechanical documents, 
filled with the proper number of names and addresses, indications 
of the corporate purposes, statements of kinds and amounts of cap-
ital stock, and a good many paragraphs about managers and officers, 
their powers and their pay. The papers must be filed, some sort of 
publication made, fees paid, organization meetings held, and cer-
tificates of completion of one or another formality carefully exe-
cuted. 
In Europe as in the United States, these formalities are for the 
local practitioner. There is no point in the American investor's 
learning their details, because he cannot perform them anyway. 
Hence, this article does not present checklists of incorporation 
steps. 
What the American investor can do is to make an intelligent 
selection of a European practitioner, explain his general objec-
tives, and review the documents which the practitioner proposes 
to file and publish. The following observations explain some of 
the differences in European practice which an American investor 
will encounter in his dealings with European legal representatives. 
The American who looks around the Common Market for a 
"corporation lawyer" encounters a puzzling situation. It is difficult 
to find any expression in any of the four languages involved which 
would accurately translate the term "lawyer,"83 much less "corpo-
ration lawyer." 
83 For general observations of the legal professions in Germany, France, and Italy, see 
BURDICK, THE BENCH AND BAR OF MANY LANDS (1939). For France, see Lepaulle, Law 
Practice in France, 50 CoLUl\l. L. REv. 945 (1950); Brown, The Office of Notary in France, 2 
INT. AND Car.IP. L.Q. 60 (1953); Tune, Modem Developments in Preparation for the llar 
in France, 2 J. LEGAL En. 71 (1949). For Germany, see Weniger, The Profession of the llar 
in Germany, 34 ILL. L. REV. 85 (1939). For Italy, see Sereni, The Legal Profession in Italy, 
63 HARv. L. REv. 1000 (1950). 
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A. The Advocate 
The American may, however, ask for a "member of the bar," 
and be led without hesitation to an "advocate" ( avocat, Rechtsan-
walt, avvocato, advocaat). The advocate is primarily a courtroom 
lawyer and is often compared to the English barrister.84 But unlike 
the barrister, he does not have to be approached through a solicitor, 
nor does he expect the facts to be gathered and the case appraised 
before it comes to him. Perhaps the advocate is best explained by 
saying that he is like one of the great general practitioners of Amer-
ica's nineteenth century, who could try a tort case, argue a constitu-
tional law appeal, and advise a corporation on its tax liability, all 
without partners or junior associates. 
Many European advocates, including some of the very best, are 
solo practitioners, except as they may have apprenticed assistants. 
In France, group practice among advocates was forbidden until 
1954.81! Since solo practitioners are not likely to be highly special-
ized in corporate matters many advocates will not draft the incor-
poration papers in their o·wn offices. Some, of course, will do so. 
Others may accept the responsibility, but delegate the work to an 
outside office to prepare the documents, especially if the American 
client seems to expect that the advocate should himself produce 
the papers. An equally normal procedure, in most of the Common 
Market countries, is for the advocate to discuss the principal prob-
lems, advise the client on some of the preliminary questions (what 
form of company, where to incorporate, what kind of management 
structure), and then send the client on to a notary to get the draft-
ing done. In some of the German states (Lander) the offices of 
advocate and notary are combined; in these states it is most prob-
able that an advocate will be found who is both a counselor on 
corporate matters and a draftsman of corporate documents. 
The plurality of possible interpretations is illustrated by the fact that Frenchman Tune 
(above) treats avocats and avoues as the only classes of French lawyers, while Frenchman 
Lepaulle (above) describes avocats, avoues, notaires, and agents d'affaires as varieties of 
"lawyers." 
84 For instance, by Brown and Tune, note 83 supra. With respect to France, there is 
some point in the barrister-advocate comparison because neither has power to "represent" 
(i.e., make binding agreements for) his client; that power belongs to the solicitor in Eng-
land and to the avoue in France. But the comparison may prove misleading, since the 
French advocate does not have to be briefed by a solicitor (as the English barrister does), 
and cannot file written pleadings (as the English barrister can). In other countries the 
advocate can bind his client. 
Su HAMELIN, AnREGE DES RiGLES DE LA PROFESSION D'AVOCAT, art. 207 (1954), citing decree 
of April IO, 1954, art. 49. 
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B. The "Attorneys-of-Record" 
In France there is a special kind of lawyer called an avow}, a 
title whose etymological connotations recall the English "attor-
ney. "86 We mention the avoue only because the identification of 
French avocats with English "barristers" leads so easily to the iden-
tification of French avoues with English "solicitors."87 Since a pro-
spective American investor in England would properly consult an 
English solicitor, the conclusion might be drawn that an American 
investor in France should consult a French avoue. 
Nothing could be farther from the mark. The job of the avoue 
is to appear of record for a litigant, to file written pleadings, to 
receive notices, and to make on behalf of the client any commit-
ments and elections which are incident to the procedure of litiga-
tion. The pleadings which are filed by the avoue may be drawn 
either by himself or by the advocate, but the oral advocacy must 
be done by the advocate. An American translation for this peculiar 
intermediary might be "attorney-of-record." 
These functions of the "attorney-of-record" resemble some of 
the functions of an English solicitor. But the "attorney-of-record" 
performs none of the functions of business counseling, property 
management, and drafting non-litigious documents, which prob-
ably occupy the larger part of an English solicitor's time, and which 
qualify him to advise an American investor. The latter functions 
are performed in France chiefly by notaries.88 
"Attorneys-of-record" form a separate profession only in France, 
and not even in all districts of that country. Although the function 
may be recognized in other countries as separate from that of 
advocacy, the same people usually perform both.89 
C. The Notary 
The European notary is also a lawyer.00 That is, he is a man 
who has a university law degree, or who has at least passed profes-
86 See ROBSON, THE ATIORNEY IN 18TH CENTURY ENGLAND (1959); or, more briefly, 
Bastian, The Profession of Law in England and America, 46 A.B.A.J. 817 (1960). 
87 They are compared by the distinguished comparatist Tune, op. cit. supra note 83, 
at 71, note I. Tune emphasized that the French avow!, like the English solicitor, has the 
power to "represent" his client. 
88 Cf. Brown, supra note 83, at 60. 
89 In Italy, a young lawyer is first admitted to practice as an "attorney-of-record" 
(procurazione); after five years he may also become an avvocato, and thereafter performs 
both functions. See Sereni, The Legal Profession in Italy, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1000 (1950). 
Luxembourg lawyers are commonly designated by the double title, avocat-avoue. 
90 See SCHLESINGER, THE NOTARY AND THE FORMAL CONTRACT IN CIVIL LAW (1941), New 
York State, Report of the Law Revision Commission 403 (observations on France, Germany, 
and Switzerland). See also Brown, supra note 83, at 60. 
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sional examinations for his position, and who makes his living 
strictly by professional work. But he generally does not appear in 
court, except when, as in some German states, he is also an advo-
cate. Since notaries handle almost all aspects of administration of 
decedents' estates, marriage settlements, and conveyances of real 
estate, they might remind an Englishman of a family solicitor; an 
American colleague might call them "office lawyers." But the Euro-
pean notary has a dignity which distinguishes him from either an 
English solicitor or an American Ia-ivyer. Like an American justice 
of the peace, he exercises a public trust, even though his income 
depends on private fees. He holds an "office" which he has either 
inherited from an ancestor, or purchased at a high price, and he 
is a custodian of records of property ownership. When he takes 
acknowledgments of documents, he is not satisfied by knowing that 
the signature is genuine; he will read or explain the entire docu-
ment to the client, and refuse to take the acknowledgment unless 
he is quite sure that the client understands every line. In fact, the 
notary is normally the draftsman of documents whose acknowledg-
ments he takes.91 
Urban notaries frequently specialize in corporate practice. It 
is no accident that some of the best French treatises on company 
law have been written by the editor of the Journal des Notaires.92 
D. Unlicensed Lawyers 
Various classes of people who are not members of any legal pro-
fession, and perhaps not of any licensed profession, also participate 
actively, competently, and lawfully in advising on incorporation 
problems. Frequently tax problems are important, and these will 
probably be referred by Ia-ivyers or notaries to tax specialists, who 
are not usually Ia-ivyers; they are sometimes, but not necessarily, 
accountants. 
Accountants may also assume the main work of planning the 
corporate organization, and drawing the papers. One Italian ad-
vocate has advised us that his accountant competitors are perfectly 
competent in corporate matters; another doubts it. 
There are also, at least in France, wholly unlicensed business 
agents ( agents d' aff aires or conseillers commerciaux) who will un-
dertake to arrange an incorporation, acting partly as advisers, and 
01 My Netherlands collaborator, Mr. Deelen, says that in his country the notary in-
variably drafts any instrument which is required to be notarized. 
02 Moreau, Editor-in-Chief of the Journal des Notaires, is the author of LES SoCIETES 
CIVILES (1954), LA SoCIE'I'E ANONYIIIE (1948), LA SOCIETE A REsPONSABILITE LIMITEE (1952). 
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partly as intermediaries for notaries and tax specialists who may be 
needed.93 The existence of these unlicensed operatives in a semi-
legal field seems to be an indirect result of the fractionation of the 
French legal profession in terms of formal procedures - formal 
appearance and filing of written pleadings (by the avoue),04 oral 
argument (by the avocat ), and drafting of non-litigious documents 
(by the notaire ). As an incident of this fractionation, counseling 
has become nobody's profession. Some of these unlicensed coun-
selors are certainly quite competent, while others certainly are not. 
Obviously the caution which is used in choosing any adviser should 
be increased when choosing one who is under no professional 
regulation or discipline. 
This interesting lacuna in French professional regulation ex-
plains the role of the many American Ia-wyers in Paris who have no 
license for any kind of practice in France. So long as they only give 
advice, referring formal procedures to licensed "attorneys-of-rec-
ord," advocates, and notaries, they may lawfully carry on activities 
which would be considered the "practice of law" if carried on in 
the United States.95 
E. Which Kind of Lawyer? 
The only professionals whose participation is required by law 
for a European incorporation are the notaries. They are needed 
for the execution of articles of a stock company in every country 
but France;96 and they are necessary in France to complete the 
company organization.97 In the formation of limited liability com-
93 See Lepaulle, supra note 83, at 947. 
94 In discussing French procedure in English one must distinguish between the written 
contentions, technically called "pleadings" in Anglo-American law [See "Pleading," BOUVIER, 
LAw DICTIONARY], and oral persuasion, colloquially called "pleading." Confusion is pro-
moted by the cognation of the English word "pleading" with its two meanings and the 
French plaidoirie, whose technical meaning is oral advocacy. 
95 An English solicitor and law teacher, Mr. L. Neville Brown, informs us that in 
England also "the lawyers' monopoly ••• has been eaten away, so far as counseling in ta."< 
and corporation matters is concerned, by the professional accountant and various business 
consultants .••. " 
96 Belgium: C. Com. I-IX, arts. 29, 31, 33; Germany: AktG, §16. The law requires 
notarial or judicial acknowledgment; notarial is the practical choice. Luxembourg: Com-
pany Law, arts. 26 and 30; Netherlands: W.K., art. 36. 
97 The cash subscriptions must be originally paid either to the National Deposit Bank 
(Caisse de depots et consignations), or to a notary; when the required fraction of subscrip-
tions has been paid in, the proceeds can be be released to the company officers only on a 
notarial affidavit that the conditions have been fulfilled. Law of 1867, art. 1. The simpler 
and most preferred procedure is to use a notary for both functions. 
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panies, they are required in Belgium, Germany, and Italy,98 but 
not in France and Luxembourg. 
Experienced European businessmen frequently use no more 
outside professional service than the law requires. They incorpo-
rate without the advice of an advocate, and use a notary only in 
the situations where the law requires it. They do not consult an 
advocate, an accountant, or a tax specialist, unless the incorpora-
tion presents unusual technical problems. 
American investors, on the other hand, have generally consulted 
European advocates, and obtained through them such services as 
might be needed from notaries, accountants, and tax specialists. 
Perhaps this has frequently been done under a belief that an advo-
cate, like an American lawyer, is the only qualified adviser on cor-
porate matters. Although such a belief would be false, the practice 
of consulting an advocate is probably sound. It is safe to say that a 
European investment by an American enterprise always involves 
problems which are unfamiliar to the investor. It seems to be the 
European consensus that the advocate is the professional most likely 
to have a sound perspective concerning the ensemble of problems 
likely to arise, and the one best qualified to draw in others' talents. 
This conclusion should be tempered by two warnings. The 
American investor should not expect his advocate to produce in 
his own office all the expertise and the documentation required; 
he should be prepared to have the advocate draw on other profes-
sionals, or send the American to them. 
It should also be clear that the American does not always need 
a European advocate. If he is reliably referred to a French or Ger-
man notary, it is probable that the notary is just as competent as 
any advocate to decide when other professional collaboration is 
needed. Likewise, an American Ia-wyer practicing in Europe (with-
out a European license) may be perfectly competent to supply the 
perspective which is commonly obtained from a European advo-
cate, and to call on the other professionals (notaries, tax specialists) 
who may be useful. 
V. THE ORGANIC DOCUMENTS 
A. Draw Them in Europe! 
The late Professor Ascarelli once remarked that it is of second-
ary importance whether the American investor asks an advocate, 
os Belgium: C. Com. I-IX, art. 4; Germany: GmbHG, §2; Italy: C. Civ., art. 2475. 
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an accountant, or a notary to draw his European articles of incor-
poration. The thing of primary importance, he said, is this: don't 
draw the articles in New York, and send them to Milan or Ham-
burg for "minor modifications." Not only are such articles invari-
ably far from the demands of local law and practice, but they im-
pose on a European lawyer the impossible job of explaining to an 
American client why they must be changed. What the American 
client should send to Milan or Hamburg is a statement of what 
activities he wants to conduct, where he expects to get his money, 
whom he expects to employ as managers, and other information on 
operational plans; the drafting he should leave to his European 
adviser. 
In the light of this advice, which appears to be very sound, there 
is not much to say on this side of the Atlantic about organic docu-
ments. I will, however, offer a few observations designed chiefly 
to improve communications between transatlantic and cisatlantic 
lawyers. 
B. Articles and By-Laws 
One does not, of course, ask a European lawyer to prepare a 
set of articles and by-laws. The Europeans do not use these two 
sets of organic documents; the functions of the two American docu-
ments are performed by a single European one. 
One might equally confuse his European counsel by asking him 
to draw a set of "articles"; the more English he knows, the more 
likely he is to be confused. For instance, he may know that the 
basic document in Delaware and New York is called the "certifi-
cate of incorporation," and in England (from which many Euro-
peans surprisingly take their English), "memorandum of associa-
tion." It may be helpful to have at hand some of the European 
names of the formative documents, acte constitutif, Griindungs-
vertrag, atto constitutivo, or akte van oprichting. 
These European names are not, however, the end of the matter. 
We have in America one set of names for the basic document, when 
we think of it as something signed and filed during the formative 
process of the incorporation; these are "certificate of incorpora-
tion," or "articles of incorporation" (varying by jurisdiction). We 
have another set which we use after the corporation has been fully 
organized, to refer to the contents of the document, including 
amendments; thus we speak of the limitations of the "charter." 
Likewise, Europeans have a set of names which signify the organic 
law of the company, as derived from the articles and amendments. 
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The principal terms are statuts, Satzung or Gesellschaftsvertrag/9 
statuti, and statuten.100 
Many of the elements found in European articles of incorpora-
tion are the same as those in American articles. They indicate the 
statutory type of company (stock or limited liability), the purpose, 
the name, the duration, and the amount of capital.1°1 In all limited 
liability companies, and in stock companies except in France, the 
in corp orators are named in the articles. To the practiced American 
eye, nothing essential is lacking, except that the purpose clause is 
much shorter. 
C. Purpose Clauses 
There are considerable variations in the laws and practices of 
the various countries with respect to purpose clauses. The law and 
practice in France is liberal. A popular form book advises the 
incorporator, after stating the objects which he has in mind, to add 
as additional objects: 
"Investment by the company, by any form or means, in any 
business and any company now existing or which may come 
into existence. 
"And all industrial operations in general."102 
Professor Houin considers this bad practice, but notes that it 
is widely followed, and that the undesirable consequences are un-
certain. 
While this approach will remind an American lawyer of some 
of the clauses seen in Delaware and other American charters, there 
is an important difference. One never encounters the three-page 
list of purposes and powers which are customary in Delaware, and 
often used in other American states. A European la-wyer would 
probably refuse flatly to use anything like it. There are at least two 
oo Gesellschaftsvertrag is generally applicable to all commercial companies, including 
stock companies, limited liability companies, and partnerships. Satzung is a special name 
for the Gesellschaftsvertrag of a stock company and for the partnership limited by shares 
(Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien). See, for example, the usage in HuECK, GESELLSCHAFl'S· 
RECHT 24, 116 (1958). 
100 Several translators have unfortunately translated statuts, statuti, and statuten as 
"by-laws." This is misleading since these terms are used by Europeans to designate provi-
sions all of which are publicly filed, and some of which are those defining such basic ele-
ments as the company's name, purpose, and capital stock. 
101 For the principal statutory sections on contents of the articles of incorporation, see 
the following: Belgium: C. Com. I-IX, art. 30 (societe anonyme), arts. 120-121 (societe a 
responsabilite Iimitee); France: Law of 1867, art. 1 (SA), Law of 1925, art. 14 (SARL); 
Germany: AktG, §16, GmbHG, §3; Italy: C. Civ., art. 2328 (SpA), art. 2475 (SARL); Luxem-
bourg: Company Law, art 27 (SA), art. 184 (SARL); Netherlands: W.K., arts. 36b, 36c, 36d. 
102 LEMEUNIER, PoURQUOI ET CoMMENT CONSTITUTER UNE SoCIETt ANONYM:e, 1-7 (1958). 
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reasons. One is that the European laws authorize the articles to 
state purposes, not powers. The other reason is that the ultra vires 
doctrine, whose ravages brought forth the inflated American pur-
pose clauses, is little known in Europe. 
Broad purpose clauses are apparently tolerated also in Ger-
many, Italy, and Luxembourg, so long as some real purpose 
exists.103 In two nations, Belgium and the Netherlands, vague or 
omnibus purpose clauses are inadmissible. The Belgian company 
law was amended in 1958 to require a "precise designation of the 
purpose of the enterprise."104 In the Netherlands, the Ministry of 
Justice is likely to refuse a permit to incorporate if the declared 
objects go beyond the potential of the company's capital. 
D. Rules of Internal Government 
Any brevity which European articles acquire through the short-
ness of their purpose clauses is soon lost by the length of their pro-
visions for internal government. The articles contain innumerable 
details on shareholders' meetings - when they are to be held, how 
they are to be called, who may be admitted, how the agenda is to 
be determined, how minutes should be kept, and how votes are to 
be counted. Many of these provisions will be found to restate prop-
ositions contained in the company law of the particular country. 
These portions of the articles are, of course, much like the typical 
by-laws of an American corporation. 
It is obviously inconvenient to be required to include all this 
material in the formally filed articles; it is of no interest to the 
state, or the creditors, or anyone other than the shareholders. But 
since there is only one organic document in European company 
law, these necessary provisions must be put in it. 
The burden of including these internal matters in the articles 
is recognized by some of the publication laws. In France and Ger-
many, publication is required only of an extract of the articles; the 
extract corresponds roughly to American articles, and excludes 
most of the "by-law" items.105 In Belgium the extract procedure 
103 My German collaborator, Professor Serick, warns that a company might be success-
fully attacked if it were formed without any specific purpose in mind, but merely to serve 
some later need which might appear; that is, a Gesellschaft auf Vorrat. 
104 C. Com. I-IX, art. 30 (1), as amended by Law of January 6, 1958. 
105 France. The extract for the societe anonyme requires: (I) type of company (e.g., 
stock company or limited partnership with shares); (2) name; (3) purpose; (4) central 
office; (5) names and addresses of members; (6) names of managers and auditors; (7) 
amount of capital, value of shares, and description of property (if any) exchanged for 
shares; • • • • (9) provisions (if any) for special reserves; (IO) whether there are any shares 
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is used for limited liability companies,106 but not, unfortunately, 
for stock companies.107 Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands 
require publication of complete articles in all cases.108 
VI. INCORPORATORS 
One of the striking peculiarities of European incorporation, 
from an American viewpoint, is the insistence on numerous in-
corporators. The laws do not generally state a minimum number 
of signers of the formative documents, but they do specify the mini-
mum number of shareholders, and European lawyers generally 
conclude that the full benefi.~ of incorporation are not attained 
until that number of shareholders exists. For stock companies, the 
minimum number is seven in Belgium, France, and Luxem-
bourg,100 and five in Germany.11° In Italy and the Netherlands, 
two will suffice for a stock company,111 and two will do for a limited 
liability company in all the countries where such a company may 
be formed.11 2 But no member of the Common Market has followed 
the example of a few American states, which permit a single inves-
tor to incorporate.113 
Requirements of this sort give little difficulty to an American 
lawyer on his home grounds; any group of clerks will do for incor-
with double vote, or any founders' shares; (11) when the company begins and expires; 
(12) the court in which the complete articles and other documents were filed. Law of 
1867, art. 57. The extract for the SARL is substantially the same. Law of 1925, arts. 13, 14. 
Germany. The extract for the stock company must contain the company name, central 
office, purpose, date of organization, names of managers, and also (if applicable) any pro-
visions which may exist limiting the duration of the company, or limiting the agency 
powers of the managers or liquidator, or limiting the "authorized" capital. AktG, §32. The 
limited liability company extract is similar. GmbHG, §IO. The cited sections refer to the 
entries in the Commercial Register, but these entries must be published by the court, see 
HGB, §10. 
100 C. Com. I-IX, art. 7 (b). The Belgian publication requirement includes two items 
which would probably be found in American by-laws - the fiscal year, and the date of the 
annual shareholders' meeting. 
101 C. Com. I-IX, art. 9. 
10s Luxembourg: Company Law, art. 8; Netherlands: W.K., art. 36f. The Italian 
company laws purport to require only filing in the Commercial Register. 
100 Belgium: C. Com. I-IX, art. 29; France: Law of 1867, art. 23; Luxembourg: Com-
pany Law, art. 26. 
110 AktG, §2. 
111 ltaly: C. Civ., art. 2247. Netherlands: No statutory provision requires more than 
one member; all sections speak of the members in plural terms, and Dutch legal theory 
regards incorporation as a group action (my Dutch collaborator uses the German term 
Gesamtakt) which requires more than one participant. 
112 Belgium: C. Com. I·IX, art. II9; France: Law of 1925, art. 5; Germany: GmbHG, §2; 
Italy: C. Civ., art. 2247; Luxembourg: Company Law, art. 183. 
113 lowA CooE §491.2 (1958); KY. REv. STAT. §271.025 (Baldwin's, 1955); MICH. COMP. 
LAws §450.3 (1948). 
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porators, and shares can be subscribed and paid for in their names. 
But many European lawyers will object to this kind of practice. 
My Belgian, French, and Dutch collaborators all warn against un-
pleasant legal consequences which might result from procedures 
of this sort; only the German colleague sees no problem. My Lux-
embourg collaborator, while disapproving the use of straw incor-
porators, reports that they are the usual thing in foreign-mmed 
companies, especially holding companies. 
The precise nature of the dangers incurred by using straw in-
corporators are not very clear. One of the consequences is said to 
be liability for losses occasioned by the pretense; but if the straw 
man's subscription is actually paid, there would seem to be no loss. 
In Belgium a statute provides that shareholders are liable for debts 
of the company until the required complement is reached.114 My 
Belgian collaborator warns that the straw man commits a crime by 
falsely representing himself to be a subscriber, which he is not;115 
but admits that the probability of prosecution is slight. 
The most serious probable consequence applies only to the 
situation in which the various incorporators are all nominees of 
one investor, so that the new company is in reality a one-man com-
pany, or a wholly-owned subsidiary from its very inception. In this 
situation European theorists (unlike American) are inclined to 
regard the company as having no legal existence. One theory be-
hind this view is the classic principle of continental law that com-
pany is the result of a contract; and a contract with only one party 
is just as impossible in European law as in American. 
Contemporary European jurists are well aware that the modern 
company is much more an institutional entity than it is a contract, 
and a few of them would be willing to discard entirely the contrac-
tual view.11 6 But the contractual theory is deeply ingrained in the 
statutory system, and jurists cannot disregard it just because they 
are tired of it. In the law of France, the law of "associations" 
(societes), which include all kinds of business corporations, as well 
as partnerships and nonprofit organizations, appears in the Civil 
Code as a subdivision of the law of contract; the French Civil 
114 Belgium: C. Com., art. 35. 
115 To the same effect, see VAN RYN, PRINCIPES DE DROIT COMMERCIAL, Part I, 496 
(1954). 
116 For a comparison of contractual and institutional concepts, see 1 HAMEL AND 
LAGARDE, TRAITE DE DROIT CoMMERCIAL 468-9 (1954). 
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Code's first words on company law are, "An association 1s a 
contract .... "117 
For these and other reasons, European theorists are accustomed 
to say that a company in which there was only one bona fide inves-
tor at the inception is a nullity. The theory has been put into effect 
in various ways. In the Nether lands, a series of tax cases attributed 
company income directly to the company's real owner, whose fel-
low-incorporator had been a mere nominee.118 In France, heirs 
were allowed to claim the property of a bank incorporated by their 
ancestor in league with straw co-investors.119 In Italy, a statute 
which makes a sole shareholder liable for the company debts might 
be applied to one who holds some of the shares through straw 
men.120 
The burden of procuring incorporators who meet European 
standards will probably not prove very heavy. For ordinary incor-
porations, there is no requirement that the incorporators be Euro-
peans;121 they can be Americans. Neither do they have to be pres-
ent; they can act by attorney-in-fact. Finally, they do not have to 
be natural persons, except for the incorporators of a Belgian limited 
liability company and for one of the seven in a French stock com-
pany; with these exceptions, they may be corporations. Hence, an 
American corporation and one of its American subsidiaries could 
be the incorporators of a limited liability company in France, Ger-
many, Luxembourg, or Italy, or of a stock company in Italy or the 
Nether lands. Seven American corporations, or seven corporations 
and individuals in any combination, could incorporate a stock 
117 C. Civ., art. 1832: "La societe est un contrat par lequel deux ou plusieurs personnes 
conviennent de mettre quelque chose en commun, dans la vue de partager le benefice qui 
pourra en resulter." This is the first section of Title IX - "of the Contract of Association" 
(du contrat de societt!). This title follows titles on sale, exchange, and bailment, and the 
title on loans. The same conceptual arrangement is met in the civil codes of Belgium and 
Luxembourg. It is only slightly different in Germany, where we need only substitute the 
word "obligation" (Schuldverhaltnis) for "contract." 
118 Decision of the Hooge Raad of Nov. 30, 1927, 3067 VvEEKBLAD VOR PRIVAATRECHT, 
NoTARIS·AMBT EN REGISTRATIE (hereinafter W.P.N.R.) 645 (1928); Decision of Jan. 12, 1927, 
3023 W.P.N.R. 850; Decision of May 30, 1928, BESLISSINGEN IN BELASTING ZAK.EN (herein-
after B.) 4279; Decision of April 15, 1931, B. 4965. 
110 Court of Cassation, decision of May 19, 1926, DALLoz, REcuEIL PERIODIQUE ET 
CluTIQUE, Part I, 25 (1929). 
120 C. Civ., art. 2362. Mr. Bruna, one of my Italian collaborators, states that prevailing 
Italian opinion permits holding through strawmen, unless there be a subjective intent to 
escape obligations. 
121 There are very few exceptions, such as, in France, petroleum extraction companies 
and newspaper publishing companies. 
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company in Belgium or Luxembourg. Six American corporations 
and one individual could form a French stock company. 
The test of bona fide investment is also easily met. One of my 
French informants, who is most positive about the danger of straw 
men, assures me that there is no danger in taking from each of the 
other incorporators a written agreement to sell his shares of stock 
at par on demand. A Dutch decision has held that a company was 
not proved to be invalid merely by evidence that one of the two 
incorporators sold his shares to the other on the very day of incor-
poration.122 
I do not pretend to appraise the importance of having bona 
fide incorporators, or the risks of not doing so. I do think that the 
American investor should be prepared for the request that he, not 
his European lawyer, should produce incorporators in the required 
number, and that each of these incorporators should pay separately 
his original subscription for shares. I have the impression that most 
American companies comply with this request, when made; and I 
think that it is wiser to comply than to become a party to a test case 
on an unsettled point of European law. 
VII. CAPITAL AND !Ts PAYMENT 
A. Statement in the Articles 
In five of the six Common Market nations, the amount of "cap-
ital" stated in the articles is quite a different thing from the "au-
thorized capital" which is stated by the articles in most American 
states. "Authorized capital" means, in America, the amount which 
may be issued before amending the charter; some of it may not be 
subscribed for some time to come, and some may never be sub-
scribed. Americans like to have a "cushion" of uncommitted stock 
to meet unforeseen needs. 
In the Common Market (outside the Netherlands) the capital 
contains no uncommitted cushion. The "capital" means the sub-
scribed capital, and the corporation is not fully organized until the 
stated amount is 100 percent subscribed. Some of the statutes say 
expressly that the company is not perfected until it reaches this 
point;123 even when the statutes are silent, the law is probably the 
122 Decision of the Hooge Raad of Dec. 14, 1932, B. 5339. 
123 Belgium: C. Com. I-IX, art. 29 (2) (stock companies); France: Law of 1925, art. 7 
(limited liability company); Germany: AktG, §22 (1) (stock companies); Italy: C. Civ., art. 
2329 (1) (stock companies); Luxembourg: Company Law, art. 26 (stock companies), art. 183 
(limited liability companies). 
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same. In consequence, the stated capital should be set at an amount 
for which present subscribers are readily available. 
If the incorporators foresee that future capital demands will 
exceed the amount for which present subscriptions are available, 
they can sometimes make charter provisions for future increases by 
means simpler than obtaining a shareholders' vote on a charter 
amendment. Italy and Germany permit stock companies to adopt 
charter clauses which authorize the managers to increase the capi-
tal.124 But the authorized increase must also be fully subscribed 
within a limited time, five years in Germany, one in Italy. In this 
respect, it is quite unlike American "authorized capital." France 
also has some statutory provisions permitting "variable capital,"125 
but they are somewhat inconvenient, and are little used.126 Other 
kinds of companies can increase their initial capital only by charter 
amendment; this applies to limited liability companies in all five 
countries, and to stock companies in Belgium and Luxembourg. 
The requirement that all capital be subscribed when the com-
pany is formed does not imply that it must all be paid in at that 
time. All the stock company laws specify some minor fraction of 
the stock which must be paid in; the fraction is 20 percent in Bel-
gium and Luxembourg, 25 percent in France and Germany, and 
30 percent in Italy.121 The limited liability company laws in France 
and Luxembourg require payment of I 00 percent of the amount 
subscribed, 128 but elsewhere the same fractional payments as in 
stock companies are permitted.120 
The fractional payment provisions are primarily directed at 
payments made in money. When shares are to be paid for in prop-
erty, different rules may apply. French law specifically provides 
that payment in property must be made in full at the formation of 
the company,130 and the Belgian law is the same.131 Elsewhere, the 
124 Germany: AktG, §169; the increase is limited to 50% of the stock before the 
increase. Italy: C. Civ., art. 2443. 
12;; Law of 1867, arts. 48-52. 
120 Some of the inconveniences are that the stock cannot be made negotiable, either in 
bearer or registered form (art. 50), and that members can resign and withdraw their shares, 
or be expelled (art. 52). 
121 Belgium: C. Com. I-IX, art. 32; France: Laws of 1867, art. I, ,i2. The balance must 
be paid within five years. Law of March 4, 1943, art. 1. Germany: AktG, §28 (2); Italy: 
C. Civ., art. 2329; Luxembourg: Company Law, art. 26. 
128 France: Law of 1925, art. 7; Luxembourg: Company Law, art. 183. 
120 Belgium: C. Com. I-IX, art. 120. However, at least 50,000 francs (about $1,000) 
must be paid in, whatever fraction of the whole it may be. Germany: GmbHG, §7; Italy: 
C. Civ., art. 2476 (cross-referring to stock company requirements). 
130 Law of 1867, art. 4. 
131 As to limited liability companies, full payment of property contributions is expressly 
required by C. Com. I-IX, art. 120. As to stock companies, the requirement of full payment 
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rules for payments in property are no stricter than for payment in 
money, and perhaps less so.132 
The result of these requirements is that the capital to be stated 
in the articles should be determined in this way: in a French, Italian 
or Luxembourg limited liability company, it should be an amount 
which known persons are willing immediately to subscribe and 
pay in full; in a Belgian, French, German, Italian, or Luxembourg 
stock company, and in a Belgian or German limited liability com-
pany, it should be an amount whch known persons are willing 
immediately to subscribe in full, and pay to the extent of 20 to 30 
percent. 
By stating the matter in this way, I am greatly oversimplifying 
the theory. In theory, it is possible to have an incorporation "by 
stages,"133 in which incorporators subscribe for part of the capital 
in the first stage, and then sell the rest of the shares through a public 
offering; the incorporation is complete at the end of the public 
offering stage. But this procedure exposes the whole venture to the 
danger that the public will not subscribe to I 00 percent of the 
offered shares; in that event, the incorporation would collapse. As 
a practical matter, well advised investors seldom if ever would launch 
a company in this way. They might seek to avoid the risk by obtain-
ing an investment banker to subscribe for the shares not taken by 
incorporators; but this stratagem is hardly practicable in a newly 
formed company. However, it may well be used in a later increase 
of capital. 
The situation in the Netherlands is quite different. Only one-
fifth of the capital stated in the articles needs to be subscribed 
forthwith, and there is no time limit on subscriptions to the re-
mainder.134 Of the fifth subscribed, only one-tenth needs to be 
paid on each subscribed share;135 a company could properly carry 
rests on the opinions of commentators. See VAN RYN and HEENEN, 2 DROIT COMMERCIAL 
11 (1957). 
132 See GODIN-WILHELMI, AKTIENGESETZ §28, note 11 (1950). 
133 Known to French commentators as fondation successive, and to Germans as 
Stuf engrilndung. Special statutory provisions to deal with the phenomenon are found in 
the French Law of 1867, art. 4, and in the German AktG, §30. 
134Netherlands: W.K., art. 36e. The subscriptions are a prerequisite to issuance of the 
Certificate of Incorporation, without which companies are forbidden to do business. 
135 W.K., art. 36g. If the amount has not been paid in, the board members are indi-
vidually and jointly liable for all the debts of the enterprise. However, the company can 
lawfully do business without the payment if the board members are prepared to bear the 
risk. 
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on business with as little as a fiftieth of the declared capital paid in. 
The declared capital thus appears to be nearly as flexible as the 
"authorized capital" of a typical American corporation. 
The minimum amounts of declared capital which are required 
by some of the European company statutes are not likely to deter 
investors who are prepared to cross the ocean to open a business; 
the highest are Germany's - about $25,000 for a stock company, 
and $5,000 for a limited liability company.136 
B. Shares of Stock; Par Value 
Some difficulty in talking about shares in European companies 
is occasioned by the fact that all the European countries have two 
terms, where we have only one. While we may speak indifferently 
of a man's "share" in a partnership, or his "share" in a corporation, 
the Europeans have one set of terms for a share in a partnership 
(part, Anteil, parte, deelbewijs) and another set (action, Aktie, azi-
one, aandeel) for a share in a stock company. This difference has to 
be noticed because in connection with the limited liability company 
Europeans always use the partnership term rather than the stock 
company term. Hence, the American investor will get a share called 
an Anteil if he invests in a German limited liability company, but 
will get a share called an Aktie if he invests in a German stock com-
pany. 
This is the European jurists' way of emphasizing that the lim-
ited liability company share is non-negotiable, while the stock com-
pany share may be negotiable. For purposes of the incorporation 
process, the two kinds of shares are much alike. Both are normally 
stated in units of identical value, and the investor acquires a given 
number of such shares, as in an American corporation, rather than 
136 Belgium: No minimum for a stock company; BFr 50,000 (about $1,000) for SPRL. 
C. Com. I-IX, art. 120. 
France: No minimum for stock company; 1,000,000 (old) Ffr (about $2,000) for SARL. 
Law of 1925, art. 6. 
Germany: 100,000 DM for stock company. AktG, §7. 20,000 DM for GmbH. GmbHG, 
§5. 
Italy: 1,000,000 IL (about $1,500) for a stock company, C. Civ., art. 2327 [reportedly 
due to be increased to 25,000,000 IL (about $40,000)]. 50,000 IL (about $75) for SARL, 
C. Civ., art. 2474 [reportedly due to be increased to 1,500,000 IL (about $2,500)]. 
Luxembourg: No minimum for stock company. 100,000 Lfr. (about $2,000) for 
SARL. Company Law, art. 182. 
Netherlands: No minimum. 
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an undivided fraction of the equity, as in an American partnership. 
He buys 200 out of 1,000 shares, not merely a "20 percent interest." 
The shares have stated money values, such as 500 francs or I 00 
marks,137 except that Belgium and Luxembourg permit stock com-
panies to issue shares without par value.138 The other countries 
do not authorize no-par shares. 
In Europe, as in America, it is forbidden to issue shares for less 
than par,139 but there is no law against issuing them above par, 
perhaps ten or twenty times above par.140 Since the European 
minimum par values are fairly low (about $1.50 for limited lia-
blity company shares in Italy, about $10 in France),141 it would 
be theoretically possible to introduce the "low-par" system in vogue 
in the United States. However, no one has done so, and it would 
not necessarily result (as it does in Delaware) in creating a large 
"surplus" which would be free of the restrictions placed on capi-
tal.142 
C. Payment for Shares -Money or Property 
The Common Market countries have a curious collection of 
provisions regarding the payment of consideration for shares. They 
are rather different from any regulations known in the United 
States, but their origin is not hard to guess. It is evident that the 
free-booting promoters of the late nineteenth century, there as here, 
issued themselves shares for which they paid nothing, or for which 
they paid in property taken at gross overvaluations, with disastrous 
results for innocent investors and creditors. 
To these evils American courts responded with doctrines mak-
ing subscribers liable for any deficiency in the value of considera-
tion received for their shares.143 Later, legislatures reacted with 
137 There are minimum share values in some countries: France: 5,000 Ffr (about $10) 
for SARL, Law of 1925, art. 6; Germany: 100 DM (about $25) for AG, AktG, §8; 500 DM 
(about $125) for GmbH, GmbHG, §5; Italy: 1,000 IL (about $1.50) for SARL, C. Civ., art. 
2474; Luxembourg: 500 Lfr (about $10) for SARL, Company Law, art. 182. 
138 Belgium: C. Com. I·IX, art. 41; Luxembourg: Company Law, art. 37. 
139 Jn the Netherlands, the underwriter may receive a discount of 6%. W.K., art. 38a. 
140 Liberty to sell for more than par is specifically granted in German stock companies. 
See AktG, §9 (2). 
141 See note 137 supra. 
142 German stock company law requires that any premium over par value be stated in 
the publicly-filed documents of organization, and that the premium should form part of a 
legal reserve which is not available for dividends. AktG, §§16 (2), 28 (2); §130. 
Italian Jaw requires that premiums should not be disbursed until a reserve equal to 
one-fifth of the stated capital is accumulated from earnings, but apparently permits dis-
bursement after that time. C. Civ., art. 2430. 
143 Scovill v. Thayer, 105 U.S. 143 (1881); STEVENS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE 
CORPORATIONS §183 (1949); BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS §§343 et seq. (1947). 
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Blue Sky laws, designed to enable government officials to determine 
whether the initial investments in the company had been duly 
made.144 European courts responded in different ways, and their 
responses explain some of the regulations on payment for shares. 
For cash payments, there are regulations of special interest in 
French, German, and Italian stock companies, which concern the 
25 or 30 percent of the stock subscriptions which must be paid in 
at or before the completion of incorporation. In France and Italy, 
they must be deposited in a bank, or with a notary, where they are 
not available to the company and its promoters until the incorpo-
ration is complete in every respect.145 Presumably these safeguards 
are designed to guarantee to creditors that the minimum capital 
has actually been paid in; or perhaps to guarantee to shareholders 
that their fell ow shareholders have also made a proportionate con-
tribution. In Germany, such payments do not have to be banked, 
but if they are, the bank must certify that the deposits are unre-
stricted.140 
For the payment of subscriptions in property, the special regu-
lations are more numerous and more complicated. One require-
ment is that payments in property must be 100 percent paid in 
before the company is fully incorporated; in France and Belgium, 
the payments on account which are sometimes permissible for cash 
subscriptions are inadmissible for subscriptions payable in prop-
erty.147 
Second, the property which is to be exchanged for stock must, 
in many instances, be stated in the articles, so that every other incor-
porator knows about it, and every creditor can learn about it. This 
is the rule in Belgium, Germany and Luxembourg both for stock 
companies and for limited liability companies.148 It is the rule for 
limited liability companies in France,149 and for stock companies 
in the Netherlands.1156 
144 Loss AND CoWETr, Bum SKY I.Aw 1-10 (1958); Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 7-16 
(1951). 
14ti France: Law of 1867, art. I. The funds must be deposited in the official national 
depositary- Caisse des Depots et Consignations-or with a notary. Italy: C. Civ., art. 2329. 
The payments must be made to a special account in any bank. 
140 AktG, §§28 (2), 29 (1). 
147 See notes 130, 131 supra. 
148 Belgium: C. Com. I-IX, art. 30 (stock company), art. 121 (limited liability com-
pany): Germany: AktG, §20: GmbHG, §5 (4): Luxembourg: Company Law, art. 27 (stock 
company), art. 184 (limited liability company). 
140 Law of 1925, art. 8. 
mo ·w.K., art. 40a. Netherlands, of course, has no limited liability companies. 
44 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 59 
A third regulation sometimes encountered is a requirement of 
appraisal; the most complicated plan of this nature is found in the 
French stock company law.151 After the stock has been subscribed, 
a first meeting of subscribers is held, at which auditors are appoint-
ed. The meeting is adjourned, the auditors appraise the property, 
and a second subscribers' meeting is held to hear and accept or 
reject the auditors' report. At this meeting, if the property transfer 
is approved, permanent officers may be elected, and the incorpora-
tion completed. In German stock companies, there is no second 
organization meeting, but independent auditors must be appointed 
to value the property, and the company must not do business until 
after the appraisal is made and reported to the court.152 In Italian 
companies of both types, a court-appointed auditor makes the ap-
praisal, which is attached to the incorporation papers; after the 
company is organized, the elected directors and auditors must re-
view the appraisal.153 
A fourth precaution taken by some legislators has been to im-
pede transfer of the shares received for property. In French stock 
companies, shares issued for property cannot be represented by cer-
tificates, and are non-negotiable, for two years after incorpora-
tion;154 in Belgium, they are not freely negotiable for approximate-
ly two years;155 in Italy, they are non-transferable until the direc-
tors and auditors have made the post-incorporation appraisal.1ti 6 
A fifth hazard is reserved for the property-subscribers in a 
French limited liability company.157 Instead of having an appraisal 
at the incorporation stage, the subscribers are made jointly liable 
to the company's creditors for any deficiency which may later ap-
pear to have existed between the value of the contributed property 
and the par value of the shares. Only when ten years have passed 
is this threat lifted. 
151 Law of 1867, art. 4. 
152 AktG, §§25, 26, 34. 
153 C. Civ., art. 2343 (stock companies), art. 2476 (limited liability companies). De-
ficiency in the value of the assets does not avoid the formation of the company, but merely 
requires a reduction in the stock aUotted to the subscriber, and consequent reduction of 
the company's stated capital, unless the subscriber pays the deficiency in money. The 
subscriber may elect to withdraw entirely, resulting in a still greater reduction in stated 
capital. 
154 Law of 1867, art. 3 (5). 
155 C. Com. I-IX, art. 47. The shares can be transferred, but only if they are in 
registered form, and the transfer is made with specified formalities. 
156 C. Civ., art. 2343; the code declares the shares inalienable (inalienabili) during this 
period. 
157 Law of 1925, art. 8. 
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These various regulations are not only burdensome; they are 
also rather fearsome beartraps, since any failure to comply may 
result in "invalidity" of the corporation, or liability of the incor-
porators, or both. The French legislator, in particular, seems to 
have prepared ambuscades for any little businessman who might 
think of turning his business over to a corporation in exchange for 
a portion of the shares. 
This situation calls for careful study by the American corpora-
tion which plans to establish subsidiaries in Europe. If the sub-
sidiary has been preceded by any operations in the area, the parent 
will be expecting to contribute both money and the property which 
was used in the pre-incorporation business. If no thought were 
given to the matter, these assets would naturally be transferred in 
exchange for stock. 
If the resulting formalities are found, on investigation, to be 
insufferable, there is sometimes a way to avoid them. Imagine, for 
instance, an American corporation which was planning to transfer 
its stock of goods and intangibles, with its current bank account, 
to a forthcoming French subsidiary. Imagine further that the par-
ent corporation planned to loan the subsidiary additional funds 
which might be useful in further development. The parent can 
greatly simplify its problem by reversing the roles of property and 
cash. Instead of contributing property, and loaning cash, it can 
contribute cash, and loan property; that is, it may buy shares for 
cash, and transfer the property on a deferred payment plan. The 
financial risk is the same (assuming the amounts are equal), but 
the juridical risks which result from the special incorporation for-
malities are escaped. There may be some new formalities to be 
observed in regard to interested managers; but these are less bur-
densome. 
In Germany, this simple reversal of roles would not help much. 
There, the special formalities which apply to exchanges of stock 
for property also apply to property purchases contemplated at the 
time of incorporation,1158 or made within two years thereafter.1159 
VIII. FILING AND APPROVAL 
The procedures of incorporation do not usually involve long 
waits for administrative action. In all the Common Market coun-
1158 AktG, §20. See also §45, concerning purchases of property amounting to one-tenth 
of the corporate capital. 
159 AktG, §45. 
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tries except the Nether lands, the ancient theory that incorporation 
is a privilege to be granted at the sovereign's discretion was discard-
ed decades ago. For local citizens, incorporation is a matter of 
right; when the correct formalities have been executed, and the 
papers deposited, there is nothing to wait for. 
Even for foreigners, there are no administrative waits in con-
nection with ordinary incorporation.160 Under international law, 
they can lawfully be excluded from incorporation if they are not 
the beneficiaries of treaties of friendship, commerce, and naviga-
tion; but in fact they are not excluded. They do indeed encounter 
administrative obstacles in obtaining licenses to be merchants or 
corporate executives; in obtaining licenses to exchange money for 
the purpose of investment; or in obtaining licenses to enter certain 
trades. But these obstacles are not connected with incorporation 
procedure. 
In the Netherlands, incorporation is not a matter of right, either 
for citizens or for foreigners. It is a privilege granted at the discre-
tion of the Ministry of Justice. In considering whether to grant an 
application, the Ministry will consider various factors - whether 
the new industry will further complicate an oversupply of goods or 
services, whether it will hurt or help the Netherlands' foreign ex-
change position, whether the proposed capital is adequate, and 
whether the financing plans offer any threat to the investment mar-
ket. Presumably, a wise investor will explore all these matters 
before preparing incorporation papers. If major policy questions 
have been cleared in advance, less than a month will usually be 
required to obtain approval of the application to incorporate. 
POSTSCRIPT 
The lawyer's job in planning a business operation - whether 
foreign or domestic - may be thought of as involving two parts: 
conception and communication. The lawyer must first form a 
mental picture of the company structure that he wants to set up, 
and of the roles which the various officials will play, individually 
and in relation to each other. Next, he must somehow communi-
cate these ideas to the officials who are to do the acting. 
On the domestic scene both parts of the job may be carried out 
almost unconsciously, because the Ia-wyer conceives of a structural 
160 The principal exceptions are (I) specially regulated types of enterprises, such as 
banks and insurance companies, and (2) enterprises in which foreign participation is lim-
ited, such as (in France) petroleum extraction and newspaper publication. 
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pattern which is completely traditional, and anyone who is named 
as president of a parent company, or president of a domestic sub-
sidiary, has the same conception as the lawyer of how he is supposed 
to act. 
When the American lawyer turns to a foreign business opera-
tion, both processes are greatly complicated. The complication of 
the communication process is obvious. An American "director" 
is not the equivalent of an Italian dirretore. Even if the "director" 
is equated with the more nearly comparable amministratore, the 
problem is not solved, because the amministratore also thinks of 
himself rather differently than does an American "director." 
But the difficulty is one of conception as well as of communica-
tion. The European institutions, and the roles which people play 
·within them, are just a little different from the institutions which 
exist, and the roles which are played, in the United States. The 
American la·wyer is in the position of a composer writing music for 
people who not only use a different system of musical notation, but 
also play different instruments on different scales from those which 
he knows. 
Most American lawyers - of necessity - probably ignore these 
differences. They make their plans in terms of Delaware certifi-
cates of incorporation, Delaware boards of directors, and Delaware 
capital and surplus. Their instructions may be quite impossible of 
execution within a foreign legal system. Most of this impossibility 
will go undetected on both sides, because the faithful foreign agents 
will carry out (in Italian) whatever seems to them the most plausi-
ble interpretation of the American wishes. They will then report 
their action (in English) in the terms of the instructions. 
So long as this system works there is no reason to change it. 
It probably is much better than it would be if the American lawyers 
succeeded in re-creating on the Italian scene a corporate structure 
duplicating precisely the one in Detroit. 
But the stiffer competition of the emerging Common Market is 
likely to demand something better. American enterprises will 
reach their full potential only if some of their management know-
how is effectively transferred to Europe, and if errors in manage-
ment are efficiently located and corrected. This means that the 
American lawyer who bears responsibility for the organization 
of a European business operation needs to know - like a com-
poser - something about the musicians who will perform his 
piece, the instruments they play, and the notations which they 
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recognize. Learning these things is an endless task, and the Ameri-
can lawyer will never know them all. But every bit that he learns 
about laws and the institutions of Common Market countries will 
contribute a little to his ability to design and control the Common 
Market operations of an American enterprise. 
